APRIL 1963

MONTHLY REVIEW

N INDEPENDENT SOCIALIST MAGAZINE

THE SPLIT IN THE CAPITALIST WORLD

THE EDITORS

VOL. 14
12

THE GREAT DEBATE: A REPLY TO BARAN AND SWEEZY

ANATOLY BUTENKO

REJOINDER

PAUL A. BARAN AND PAUL M. SWEEZY

The Varieties of Land Reform

ANDREW GUNDER FRANK

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

CONTENTS

VOLUME FOURTEEN NUMBER TWELVE APRIL 1963

REVIEW OF THE MONTH: The Split in the Capitalist World 641
THE VARIETIES OF LAND REFORM by Andrew Gunder Frank 656
THE GREAT DEBATE: A REPLY TO BARAN AND SWEEZY
by Anatoly Butenko 663
REJOINDER: by Paul A. Baran and Paul M. Sweezy 669
WORLD EVENTS by Scott Nearing 679
BOOKS: SUBMIT OR FIGHT? by Conrad J. Lynn 685
THE LEGACY OF SLAVERY by Ursula Wassermann 688
AMERICAN RADICALISM: FURTHER DISCUSSION
by Max Gordon, and Robert E. Jackson 693
CONTENTS OF VOLUME XIV 702

MONTHLY REVIEW: Published monthly except July and August when bimonthly, and copyright, ©1963, by Monthly Review, Inc. Second class postage paid at New York, N. Y.
EDITORIAL AND BUSINESS: 333 Sixth Avenue, New York 14, New York.
Telephone: CHelsea 2-6494.
Unsolicited manuscripts will not be returned unless accompanied by a stamped, self-addressed envelope.
NEWSSTAND DISTRIBUTOR: B. De Boer, 188 High Street, Nutley, N. J.
SUBSCRIPTION PRICE: One year—$6 in the U.S.; $7 foreign.
By 1st class mail—U.S. $9; everywhere else $11.
By air mail—No. America $11; So. America and Europe $15; Asia (incl. USSR), Africa, Australia $17.

EDITORS: Leo Huberman and Paul M. Sweezy.

NOTES FROM THE EDITORS

We are rushing through press a short new book entitled *Three Tactics: The Background in Marx,* by Stanley Moore, whose work is known to many MR readers and who is now teaching philosophy at Barnard College. This book is a guide to the thought of Marx and Engels on the tactics of socialist revolution and thus provides invaluable aid in understanding the disputes over ideology and policy which are racking the socialist world today. Publication date will be in May, and the price will be $2.25. In the meantime, MR readers can order *Three Tactics* now at the special prepublication price of $1.50.

We have had an unusually large number of requests for review copies of *The Menace of the Miracle: Germany From Hitler to Adenauer* by Heinz Abosch, from which we hope we are correct to infer that there will be an unusually large number of reviews. In any case, it shows that the book is arousing much interest. In this connection, we remind you that publication date is April 22nd, after which the price will be $5. If you act immediately, you can still get the book at the prepublication price of $3.25.

An editor friend whose opinion we value highly writes: "I've just finished reading *Education and the Working Class.* It's a truly remarkable piece of work—damn well conceived, organized, reported, written and, finally, *imagined.* I got something out of every page of it. For anyone who hasn't yet read it, here is my informal guide to the book: (1) Read the Note to the American Reader and the 10-page Introduction. (2) Shop around in the text itself for, say, 40 minutes or maybe 60 minutes. If you're

(continued on inside back cover)

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE SPLIT IN THE CAPITALIST WORLD

The rejection of Britain's bid to enter the European Common Market marks the biggest setback for United States global policy since the victory of the Chinese Revolution in 1949. It seems likely that a radically new period of postwar history is opening.

To understand why this is so, it is necessary to have in mind a conception of the general aims of American policy, of what has been called Washington's "Grand Design" for the world of the second half of the 20th century. This design has of course never been laid down in a precise blueprint, but its main outlines are well known and have been described in general terms in innumerable public pronouncements. For example, in his 1961 trade expansion message to Congress, President Kennedy said:

> The combined output and purchasing power of the United States and Western Europe—nearly a trillion dollars a year—is more than twice as great as that of the entire Sino-Soviet world. Though we have only half the population, and far less than half the territory, we can pool our resourcefulness in an open trade partnership strong enough to outstrip any challenge, and strong enough to undertake all the many enterprises around the world which the maintenance and progress of freedom require. If we can take this step, Marxist predictions of "capitalist" empires warring over markets and stifling competition would be shattered for all time—Communist hopes for a trade war between these two economic giants would be frustrated—and Communist efforts to split the West would be doomed to failure.

One need only know that in official Washington language "partnership" means American control, to see in this statement a bold claim to United States hegemony over the "free world." This is the keystone of the "Grand Design," and the way it is to be implemented can be deduced from the specific decisions and policies of the present administration and those which preceded it in office during the past two decades. To put the matter in the simplest possible terms, American hegemony is to be

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

achieved and perpetuated in two ways: first, through an American empire organized and directed from Washington; and, second, through two subordinate empires headed respectively by the Common Market expanded to include Britain, and Japan. Each of the two subordinate empires is to be organized and directed from its own metropolis, with Washington retaining an ultimate veto power over policies and decisions which are deemed inimical to the interests of the "free world" as a whole, that is to say, inimical to the interests of the American ruling class as interpreted in Washington. All three metropolises—the American, the European, and the Japanese—have a free rein to exploit their own empires through long-term investments, provision of banking and other services, controlling import and export trade, and so on. The U. S. participates in the exploitation of the subordinate empires primarily through investment in the metropolises—the form of U. S. foreign investment which has tended to be quantitatively predominant in the last few years.

The techniques in use for achieving these results are varied and numerous. First, there is the crucially important ideological justification for the acceptance by all concerned of U. S. hegemony. This of course is the Communist menace, compounded of the threat of Soviet (and/or Chinese) aggression and the threat of internal subversion. All countries in the "free world" are supposed to be in mortal danger from one or both of these threats; they all therefore need U. S. military protection and none can afford to go it alone for fear of being picked off one at a time. Granted these premises, the legitimacy of U. S. hegemony, indeed the urgent necessity for it, follows automatically. In the light of this, it is not surprising that the propagation of anti-Communism becomes the central task of all intellectual and educational effort by the American ruling class. To the extent that the anti-Communist message gets through to the masses in the dependent countries, their very dependency acquires a popular base.

Economically, U. S. hegemony is buttressed by a wide variety of techniques depending on the particular situation and requirements of the different dependencies. Private investment, government loans, monopolization of vital imports or exports,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

control over important technologies—these are examples of the kinds of leverage exercised by the U. S. on the dependent economies. In this connection, however, an important fact must be noted: because of vigorous economic development in Europe and Japan during the past decade or so, U. S. economic leverage on the subordinate empires is much less than it used to be. As far as Western Europe is concerned, indeed, it can now be said that full economic independence has been achieved.

Politically, the methods employed by the United States range from a complicated network of pacts and alliances to the classical techniques of divide-and-rule practiced by all the great empire builders of the past. Dependencies are graded in a hierarchical scale of status and privilege; rivalry for favor is encouraged and the contestants are suitably rewarded or punished; excessive power concentrations are either prevented from forming or are watered down if they occur. It is in this connection that the matter of British entry into the Common Market acquires its transcendent importance for American policy. The United States encouraged the formation of the Common Market by the original Six (France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands, and Luxembourg) and then saw it grow rapidly in coherence and strength. The threatened emergence of a powerful rival was an obvious danger that had to be countered. The tactic chosen by the U. S. was to push Britain, the most privileged ally, into the Market, thereby ensuring that U. S. interests would at all times be respected. After British entry, the cohesiveness of the grouping would be further weakened by the adherence of some or all of Britain's partners in the European Free Trade Association (Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, and Switzerland). French President de Gaulle, in his famous news conference of January 14th, foresaw the results with great clarity: a community increasing in this way, he said,

> would be faced with the problems of its economic relations with all sorts of other nations and, first of all, with the United States. It is to be foreseen that the cohesion of its members, who would be very numerous and very different would not stand up for long and that in the last resort it would appear as a colossal Atlantic Community dependent upon a control by the United States and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

which would have soon absorbed the community of Europe. (*New York Times,* Western Edition, January 15, 1963.)

The military means of ensuring American hegemony again vary according to the specific situation of the various dependencies. Financial aid for purchase of American weapons plus military training missions may be sufficient to guarantee the loyalty to Washington of dominant military establishments in some of the weaker dependencies. One-sided treaties providing for U. S. military bases create quasi-occupation regimes. Integrated commands, such as those which characterize the NATO military setup, have the effect of bringing part of the allies' forces under direct American control. Finally, and most important vis-à-vis the leaders of the subordinate empires, the United States aims to maintain an absolute and pre-emptive military preponderance by preventing any of its allies from achieving an effective nuclear capability.

Such, in briefest outline, is the Grand Design for a "free world" run from Washington. If it could be realized—if all the parts could be put together and made to function smoothly —the United States could then proceed to attempt a settlement with the socialist world, either through a continuation and intensification of the Cold War or, much less likely, through some sort of an agreement to live and let live.

Now it is clear that the rejection of Britain's bid to join the Common Market, together with the closely related refusal of France to accept the U. S. plan for a so-called multilateral nuclear force (in reality a device for perpetuating America's atomic monopoly in the "free world"), have dealt a shattering blow to all Washington's calculations. The concentration of power represented by the Common Market is not to be watered down by the admission of the most favored ally of the United States. It can hardly be over-emphasized that this has far more than merely negative significance. The Common Market grouping will naturally go on building up its power, and the United States will either go on trying to bring it under control or set about breaking it up. Whichever aim the U. S. pursues, the two power centers are now certain to develop as antagonists in a continuing and intensifying struggle. In the world of power politics, there is simply no middle road between subordination

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and struggle for supremacy. The rejection of Britain's entry was at the same time the Market's rejection of subordination; from now on there can only be struggle.

The French decision to go ahead with the development of an independent nuclear capability was a logical corollary and necessary complement of the rejection of Britain's entry. Nor does this decision have only military significance. In the world as it is constituted today, technological independence necessarily implies military independence. If France were to renounce the development of nuclear weapons, she would at the same time be putting shackles on her own scientific-technological development. She would, in other words, be accepting technological as well as military subordination to the United States. (France is the country principally involved at the moment, but it goes without saying that the other members of the Six, especially West Germany, will soon be fully immersed in the military-technological race—according to some accounts, the French atomic effort is already in reality a Franco-German effort.)

One part of the American Grand Design, perhaps the most important part, thus lies in ruins. The nucleus of what was to have been the subordinate European empire has opted out and now has no choice but to try to build an independent empire. The "free world," far from being united under U. S. leadership, is divided against itself and threatened with internecine strife.

But this is still not all. Though it is perhaps not yet obvious, recent events cannot help having a serious undermining effect on the anti-Communist ideology which, as previously noted, provides the sole justification for America's claim to "free world" hegemony. Not that the Common Market is any less impeccably anti-Communist than the United States, of course. The point is that by taking the course they are now embarked upon, the Six are in effect laughing at the whole elaborate pretense that there is a danger of aggression from the Soviet Union. As Walter Lippmann put it even before the rejection of Britain's entry bid:

> European and American feelings differ about how urgent, immediate, and earth-shaking is the Soviet challenge. Our European

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

allies are not getting ready to call up reserves, and they are much less hot and bothered about Mr. Khrushchev than we are. . . . Quite evidently, though as well aware as any man of the challenge from the Soviet Union, General de Gaulle does not consider it a risk to sidetrack Great Britain, to alienate the Commonwealth, and to cold shoulder the United States. (*New York Herald Tribune*, November 13, 1962.)

And the decision to develop an independent nuclear capability merely underlines the same point. France's deterrent power will not be a reality for several years at best. Can even a schoolboy believe that it has anything to do with fear of an attack on Western Europe by the USSR? De Gaulle is saying in no uncertain terms that the Soviet Union is no military threat to anyone. That particular bogey, which in the past has been such a reliable weapon in the American arsenal, seems about played out. The consequence should be a world-wide loosening of the bonds that tie the dependencies of the United States to the metropolis.

It may be said that our whole argument rests on a shaky foundation, that the sharp turn events have taken in the last few months is the work of two old men deluded by dreams of their countries' past greatness, and that when they have departed the scene, or perhaps even sooner, everything will revert to normal: Britain will be admitted to the Common Market and Europe will slip back into its appointed place in the American Grand Design. This is certainly the hope of the United States and, what is more important, there need be no doubt that Washington will move heaven and earth to see that the hope comes true.

This line of argument—or for that matter any other that rests on a personalist interpretation of the Common Market and its policies—we find completely unconvincing. It is no doubt true, as we are continuously being told, that de Gaulle is a power-hungry megalomaniac obsessed with the idea of the grandeur of France, that he is now the exclusive architect of French policy, that Adenauer's support has been of crucial importance, and that there is widespread opposition to the two old autocrats throughout the Common Market. What the argument neglects to say is that de Gaulle and Adenauer would not be able to hold the positions and exercise the power they do unless

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

they had the backing of the decisive sectors of the French and German ruling classes. If this is so, as we believe it is, the conclusion which follows is that their departure from the scene is most *un*likely to lead to any basic changes in the nature or policies of the Common Market.

These policies are to gain political and military independence of the United States, build up the power of the group internally, and expand its possessions and spheres of influence abroad. It seems to us beyond any question that these are the policies which the Big Business rulers of France and Germany have historically pursued whenever they have been in a position to do so. That they did not for roughly a decade and a half after World War II was because they were not in a position to, not because they didn't want to. During that period they were dependent on U. S. economic aid, and they accepted political and military subordination as its price. By now, however, they have recovered their economic independence, and it is wholly natural that they should move to recover their political and military independence as well. Moreover, their economic strength, joined to that of their partners in the Six, is ample to sustain all-around independence and to enable them to contemplate with equanimity, nay with eagerness, a struggle for supremacy against the United States. The personal attitudes and wishes of de Gaulle and Adenauer thus correspond to the objective needs of the classes they represent. It is so with all "great" historical politicians and statesmen.

What, then, is the source of the opposition to de Gaulle and Adenauer inside the Common Market? This is an interesting subject which would repay careful study. We would suggest that there are three main sources.

First, and probably least important, there are segments of the ruling class, probably relatively small, which stand to lose from the exclusion of Britain or from other policies now being adopted (producers selling to the British market, importers of grain from the U. S. and Canada, etc.).

Second, there are all those who are directly or indirectly dependent on U. S. private investments in the Common Market countries. Though, as is well known, U. S. investment in the area has been rising steeply in recent years, the size and im-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

portance of this group should not be over-estimated. According to latest available Commerce Department figures, the value of U. S. direct investments in France in 1961 was $841 million, in Germany $1,170 million, and in the Common Market as a whole $3,041 million. These figures compare with $3,523 million in Britain and $11,804 million in Canada.* In other words, continental Europe is still not an area of extreme U. S. investment concentration. In relative terms, a well informed French writer has estimated that U. S. investments in France account for between 5 and 6 percent of the national total, and the proportion cannot be significantly different for West Germany or the Market as a whole.** Quite clearly, the apparently widespread notion that the U. S. monopolies through direct investment have grabbed control of the continental economies is a myth. (The very much higher concentration in Britain, incidentally, obviously helps to explain why Washington is so anxious to shoehorn Britain into the Market.)

The third, and we would judge by far the most important, source of opposition to the de Gaulle-Adenauer course comes from the vested political and bureaucratic interests that have grown up during the years of European subordination to the United States. Most of Western Europe's leading politicians and civil servants have climbed to their present positions during this period. Their most valued skill has been their ability to get along with and get results from the trans-Atlantic benefactor. Those infected with anti-Americanism (a varied group to be sure but certainly including everyone with a strong sense of personal and national dignity) have been shunted aside or denied promotion. As a result of this process of selection, the governing elite in Western Europe has acquired a thoroughly lackeyized mentality: they do not want independence from the United States, they fear it in much the same way that the ruling classes in Latin America fear it, and they will do their best to prevent its realization. It is, above all, *this* opposition that de Gaulle and Adenauer must overcome.

---

*Samuel Pizer and Frederick Cutler, "Expansion in U.S. Investments Abroad," *Survey of Current Business,* August 1962, p. 22.

**Jacques Malterre, "L'Europe Colonisée," *France Observateur,* February 7, 1963.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

There are two main reasons for believing that they will succeed. In the first place, as already indicated, the great trusts and combines which are at least as dominant in the European economies as their counterparts are on this side of the Atlantic, have every interest in independence from the United States. In an historical sense, indeed, de Gaulle and Adenauer are merely their instruments in lifting the yoke of subservience to the United States which had to be endured during the period of postwar reconstruction. The conflict between the politicians and bureaucrats on the one hand and the monopoly capitalists on the other is neatly illustrated by a recent report from Rome by the columnist Joseph Alsop. Describing the Italian reaction to de Gaulle's "bold attempt to transform the European Common Market into an exclusive, protectionist Europe inspired by a new 'continental nationalism,' " Alsop writes that

> the Italian government leaders, from President Segni and Prime Minister Fanfani down to the able permanent officials in the ministries, are completely united in their distaste for the Gaullist conception of Europe. In the business and industrial communities, however, support for de Gaulle is already discernible. And this pro-de Gaulle tendency may grow importantly, especially if it is aided by clumsy American diplomacy. (*Washington Post,* March 6, 1963.)

If this is the case in Italy, how much greater is de Gaulle's support likely to be in France and Germany which have even bigger and stronger monopolies as well as deep-rooted traditions of struggling for world leadership! We would say that this "pro-de Gaulle tendency" (really a pro-independent imperialist tendency) is certain to grow, while the opposite tendency, represented by Segni, Fanfani, et al, is equally certain to decline.

The second main reason for believing in the success of the de Gaulle-Adenauer line is that it is likely to have genuine popular support. Nationalism is a two-edged weapon which operates differently in different situations. If the Common Market appeared in the eyes of Europeans as a device for perpetuating the dominance of the United States over its allies, nationalism would work against it. If, on the other hand, the Common Market appears as a device for throwing off American dominance and enhancing the relative standing of the European

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

member countries, then nationalism works for it. Since the de Gaulle-Adenauer policies obviously give the Market the latter character, it is safe to say that they can rely on nationalist support. It needs only to be added that Western Europe is the birthplace of modern nationalism and that there is no habit of mind that is more deeply ingrained in the European peoples. Observant reporters have noted that the events of recent months have already produced a marked change in attitude among Europeans. Writes Ray Vicker in the *Wall Street Journal* from Brussels:

> In the red plush interior of the Ondres Restaurant near the Theatre Royal de la Monnaie, a helpful waiter recommends the lobster entente cordiale to a hungry diner. Says he (in that lordly manner of European waiters): "It is much better than lobster a l'Americaine."
>
> That waiter's tone is being adopted by many another European today when referring to American ideas—especially in the field of diplomatic policy. As a result, President Kennedy's "grand design" for an Atlantic partnership of Western nations faces rough sledding. Moreover, even if a grand design materializes, there are increasing signs that it will not have a made-in-America stamp on it, nor will the end product be entirely to American liking. (*Wall Street Journal,* January 23, 1963.)

If we are right that the de Gaulle-Adenauer policies serve the interests of the monopolists and express the nationalistic sentiments of the masses, there can hardly be any doubt that they will prevail over the pro-Americanism of the hack politicians and the bureaucrats. These gentlemen are either going to have to accept the new dispensation (which many of them will manage without too much difficulty) or else be replaced by others (of whom there are plenty waiting to step forward).

Let us attempt now to survey some of the possible implications of the split in the capitalist world which is now opening up and in our judgment is certain to grow wider and deeper as time goes on. This is of course an enormous subject which could hardly be treated satisfactorily in a volume, let alone a brief essay. The following remarks should therefore be taken in the spirit in which they are offered, as suggestions for further thought and study.

Taking the United States first, we may quote again from

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the article by Ray Vicker in the *Wall Street Journal* of January 23rd:

> For the U. S. that trend [toward an independent Europe] has some uncomfortable implications. Among them: Possible loss of a substantial part of its agricultural exports to Europe, tough bargaining before any trade concessions are won under the administration's Trade Expansion Act, a fierce fight in those negotiations over just about every exception to tariff cutting that may be advanced by U. S. negotiators to protect specific American industries, possible reorganization of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and continuation of national nuclear forces in the Western alliance.

This by no means exhausts the list, of course. What is likely to be of particular importance is an intensified struggle for dependencies and spheres of influence in the underdeveloped areas of the world. During the past two decades, the United States has used its paramount position in the "free world" to steal one area after another from the older colonial empires and to add the stolen territories to its own string of dependencies. In this manner, South Korea, Taiwan, and Okinawa have been transferred from the Japanese empire to the American, South Vietnam has been transferred from the French empire, Pakistan and Iran from the British, and so on. Similarly, British and German investment and influence, once so prominent in South America, have been liquidated in some countries and sharply curtailed in others. With the re-establishment of a strong and independent imperialist power in Europe, however, this process of one-way transfers is likely to be halted and even reversed. The Congo perhaps offers us a preview of what is in store in other countries and continents. It probably requires no elaborate argument to prove that the Tshombe-Adoula struggle was at bottom a struggle of the Belgians to hold on to the extremely lucrative Katanga mining complex against the bold bid of the United States to use the UN to bring the whole Congo into the American sphere of influence. The fall of Tshombe seemed to signalize a resounding victory for the United States. And yet one of Adoula's first acts after this military denouement was to accept an invitation to visit Brussels. The resulting talks are said to have ended in "complete success. . . . A joint com-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

muniqué was issued after the last meeting between the Congolese Ministers and a Belgian delegation headed by Premier Theo Lefevre and Foreign Minister Paul-Henri Spaak. It said the talks had been conducted 'in a particularly cordial atmosphere' and had revealed 'a complete similarity of views between both governments.'" (*New York Times,* Western Edition, March 1, 1963.) Belgium, it seems, is now seeking to buy Adoula out from under the Americans' noses, and with the wealth of Katanga still firmly in its grasp the chances of success would appear to be very favorable. Adoula evidently has every interest in playing the two off against each other with a view to finally selling out to the highest bidder. (The Congolese people of course have nothing but misery to gain from all this haggling over the right to exploit them, but their welfare is the last thing that any of the principals involved are concerned with.)

Be that as it may, a world-wide struggle for empire is clearly in the offing, and the United States, having had everything its way for two decades, is pretty sure to suffer some defeats and losses. At the same time, the price of local ruling groups will go up: competition among buyers, they say, always has the effect of ensuring a fairer price to sellers. All of which, it may be surmised, will not do much to solve the U. S. balance-of-payments problem or to stimulate a lagging domestic economy sorely in need of expanded overseas "living space."

What about Britain? To begin with, one must understand that the door to the Common Market is by no means permanently closed to the British. As de Gaulle made quite clear at his January 14th press conference, they can enter any time they are ready to give up their special relation with the United States. In other words, they can enter if and when the effect of their entrance would be to strengthen the Common Market rather than transform it. The basic condition for such an entry is clear: cut all bilateral military ties to the U. S. and pool nuclear capabilities and research with those of the continental partners. The British would also have to bring as large a part of their remaining empire as possible into the Market on an associate membership basis like that now held by most of France's ex-colonies in Africa. But there is no point in speculating further about this at the present time since it is perfectly clear

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

that the one thing the British are not prepared to do is give up their position as most favored ally of the United States.

From this premise certain consequences flow. As the struggle between the U. S. and the Common Market intensifies, Britain will inevitably be squeezed from both sides. Both will try to take away her markets and colonies (or neo-colonies), and as her situation deteriorates, she will be thrown into ever closer dependence on the United States. At some stage along this gloomy route British Big Business might decide that it would be better after all to throw in their country's lot with the Market. It is hard to see what other alternatives are now open to Britain. The idea of turning the Commonwealth into an independent (and liberal) third force in the "free world" is totally impractical, the more so since large parts of the Commonwealth are already under American domination (for example, Canada and Pakistan) and even larger parts appear to be in the process of falling under American domination (for example, India and Nigeria). The Commonwealth is much more likely to provide battlegrounds between the American and European empires than to form the basis of a British-led third force. If the Labor Party were a real socialist party, it might be able to lead Britain into the socialist camp where the country would enjoy independence of both capitalist empires and could in addition find all the markets needed for rapid economic growth. But the Labor Party is not now a real socialist party and the day when it may become one is still apparently a long way off.

As for the underdeveloped countries in the "free world," one must make a distinction. We have already suggested in connection with the Congo that the ruling groups can play the imperialist powers off against each other and thereby extract better terms for themselves. As far as the masses are concerned, however, it makes hardly any difference whether they are exploited by Americans or Europeans, and it matters just as little whether the local agents of the imperialists are paid better or worse. If the masses are able to win genuine concessions, as sometimes they are, the reason is their own strength and militancy, not the competition of the imperialists for their favor. Imperialist rivalry is after all nothing new, and so far as we know there is not a single case in which it can be shown to have

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

benefited the people in the exploited lands. Rather the contrary: they are usually made to pay, in one way or another, the costs of deciding who is to have the privilege of battening off their misery.

This does not mean that it is a matter of indifference to the peoples of the underdeveloped countries whether the imperialists are united or divided. Their real hope, their *only* real hope, is to escape altogether from the clutches of imperialism and to join the socialist world. Hence anything that weakens imperialism as a whole is good for them: their escape becomes that much easier. And anything that strengthens the socialist world is also good for them: more assistance can be given them both along the escape route and after they have reached their destination. It will probably be generally agreed that an imperialist system divided against itself is weaker than one united under a single leader and that on this count therefore, recent developments are altogether favorable to the real interests of the underdeveloped countries. That the split in the imperialist camp will actually strengthen world socialism, however, is less obvious. Still, we believe that it is both true and important.

For one thing, the rift between the imperialist giants should serve materially to lessen the purely military pressure on the socialist countries. In more concrete terms, to the extent that West Germany gets caught up in a struggle against the United States for markets and spheres of influence, her attitude toward her neighbors to the East is bound to be affected. Germany has twice suffered military disaster as a result of fighting two-front wars. Left to itself, the German ruling class might make the same mistake again, but there is less likelihood that the integrated ruling class of a Western European empire will do so. Its orientation will be more toward the Iberian peninsula in Europe and toward Africa and Latin America overseas. Under these circumstances, the working out of some sort of *modus vivendi* in Central Europe would become a realistic possibility. With the threat of German aggression thus reduced, the socialist countries of Eastern Europe could divert resources from military to civilian uses and in this way step up their rate of growth.

Analagous considerations apply in the field of economic relations between capitalist Europe and socialist Europe. It is

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

well known that Western European capitalists (including Germans) have few if any scruples about trading with the East and that it has been American influence that has prevented them from doing so on a much larger scale. With the restraining grip of the Americans broken, this trade should flourish, to the great benefit of both sides. For the Western Europeans, this may well become a crucially important matter in the next few years. Their present boom, like all capitalist booms, rests on overproduction of capital goods. When creeping stagnation sets in, as it did in the United States already during the 50's,* the pressure of the big monopolies to open up new markets will steadily mount. In part, this will take the form of intensified struggle against the Americans. But it will also take the form of increased trading with the East, probably on more and more advantageous terms for the latter. That this will facilitate the rapid development of the socialist societies, not only in Europe but on all other continents as well, goes without saying.

For the socialist world, then, the implications of the imperialist split are all favorable. And this means that for the peoples of the underdeveloped countries the implications are also favorable. But no one should misinterpret this statement. It does not mean that the peoples of the underdeveloped countries can expect any immediate or direct benefits from the quarrels of their imperialist masters. In the short run, indeed, they may suffer, as the Congolese have suffered during the last three years. What it does mean is that the conditions for overthrowing imperialist rule altogether are improving and will continue to improve. We are clearly reaching a stage of world history when for the poor and exploited who make up the vast majority of mankind, no other goal makes sense and therefore no other goal is worth striving for.

(March 17, 1963)

*Much of the European Left has succumbed to the view that "neo-capitalism" is no longer subject to such ills. The Right has retained a better sense of proportion, as shown by the example of the arch-conservative Swedish economist Per Jacobsson, managing director of the International Monetary Fund: "Western Europe," he told a convention of the American Bankers Association, "is going to encounter more problems like those of the United States than it has in recent years." (*New York Times*, Western Edition, February 26, 1963.)

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE VARIETIES OF LAND REFORM

BY ANDREW GUNDER FRANK

Land reform projects are mushrooming all over the globe. But not all land reform programs are the same. In Latin America, especially under the impetus of the Alliance for Progress, several countries have passed or are discussing land reform laws. Concerned and progressive people everywhere scrutinize these proposals and laws, and often criticize them for being too mild or otherwise misdirected. It is important to distinguish between the varieties of land reform proposals and counter-proposals and to learn which deserve support and which opposition.

Fundamental to any analysis of the problem of land reform is the fact that it is not so much an administrative, or even an economic, as it is an essentially political, process. Beginning, then, with this notion of a political process, we can conveniently distinguish three types of supposed land reform.

The first excludes any significant political change. It is the type of "land reform" proposed by conservatives. It is exemplified by the laws which the legislatures, often controlled by the landowners themselves, have recently found it convenient or necessary to pass in several Latin American countries today. In the same category should be included the voluntary donations of land by the Church or by the landowners themselves. This type of land reform is the last resort of the landowner and is really no reform at all.

The second attempts to incorporate all or part of the peasantry into the already existing national political community. This type of land reform finds much support among the critics of the first type and is proposed by several political groups, among them in Latin America the Christian Democrats and, more often than not, the Communists. It has been exemplified

The author taught economics for four years at Michigan State University. During the last year he has been in Latin America studying conditions in the various countries at first hand.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in the Mexico of Cárdenas, the Guatemala of Arbenz, the Egypt of Nasser. My contention will be that, however persuasive the arguments in favor of it, land reform which aims merely to integrate the peasantry into the existing social order is likely to fail even to meet the announced ends of its proponents.

The third attempts from the outset to effect a rapid and fundamental transformation of the existing order itself. It begins with a far-reaching change in the entire society, as exemplified in Cuba, and appears to be the only type which can meet minimum demands. It is therefore the only type of land reform worthy of the name.

A convenient index—although, as we shall see, it is also more than that—by which to distinguish the various types of land reform is the speed, or lack of speed, with which the reform is undertaken. At the rate at which land was distributed in Guatemala in the post-Arbenz years (1955 to 1961), it would take 148 years for all peasant families to receive some land—if there were no population growth in the meantime. The return to United Fruit and other owners, of land previously expropriated, the purchase by the government of worn-out lands, and other related measures indicate that the Guatemala "reform" falls into the first type, in which there is no political change whatever. In Venezuela, the government of which is often cited as making a real effort at a land reform in depth, the Presidential propaganda figures speak of 50 thousand families receiving 3.5 million acres of land in the nearly 4 years of the Betancourt government. (See, for example, *Time* magazine, March 1, 1963, p. 22.) However, in a report recently published jointly by the Venezuelan National Agrarian Institute, the Ministry of Agriculture, the Agrarian Bank, and the National Planning Office, it appears that in the last 25 years, all put together, no more than 1.4 million acres have been distributed to 35,622 families. It is not specified how much of this was distributed during the tenure of the present government. *On the other hand, it is true that 3.5 million acres were expropriated and paid for, often at exorbitant prices and in cash amounts in excess of the maximum prescribed by law.* This particular "land reform," in other words, has been big business for the landowners who have been able to sell no-longer-wanted land, and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

no doubt, to invest the proceeds elsewhere (including abroad). The land reform laws recently enacted in Peru and Chile are even milder than the reforms already put into practice in Guatemala and Venezuela. Almost all imaginable protection is afforded to the landowner rather than to the peasant. The conclusion is inescapable: measures of this type are not land reforms at all. They are out and out frauds.

The second type of land reform merits more serious discussion. Its advocates propose to incorporate the peasants into the social and political life of the nation through a process which mobilizes all of the progressive forces against the conservatives but which leaves the foundations of their power intact. The reformers would seek at the same time to redirect rural credit, technical assistance, etc., so that these measures would benefit the peasants and not just the medium and large landowners, as at present. The time period envisaged is usually of the order of 5 to 15 years. Variations on this second type of land reform can be found in the experience of Mexico, of Guatemala before the counter-revolution of 1954, and of Egypt since 1952.

It seems to this writer that the viability of this second type of land reform is highly questionable, both on theoretical grounds and on the evidence of historical experience. Two dangers, especially, arise which threaten its success: The first is that leaving the power of the conservatives intact ensures continued opposition to the reforms and puts roadblocks in the way of mobilizing the progressive forces. Though they may have been pushed out of governmental office, the conservatives nevertheless retain the ability to slow down and ultimately destroy the land reform. They can refuse to provide necessary investment funds, they can sabotage the operation of government agencies charged with implementing the reforms, organize hostile propaganda campaigns, enlist foreign support against their own government, and so on. At the same time, the political jockeying and maneuvering that progressives must engage in to counter this conservative opposition, demands compromises which tend to undermine the reform and turn it into a series of half measures.

The second danger is that carrying out a land reform at

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the slow rate of 5 to 15 years and within the framework of the existing institutions creates groups which acquire a vested interest in maintaining their new advantages and which therefore readily ally themselves with conservatives in opposing the extension of the same benefits to still other groups.

The relevance and importance of these obstacles are demonstrated by the attempts, both successful and unsuccessful, to complete a land reform of the second type. The 1952 land reform of the Arbenz government in Guatemala was, of course, much swifter and more far-reaching than the so-called reforms of recent years in that country. Nonetheless, while the conservatives suffered losses, the sources of their power were hardly touched, with the result that they were able, with the help of the Dulles brothers, to organize a counter-revolution. Nor was it possible, because of the slowness of the reforms, to create beneficiary groups large and powerful enough to defend the reform movement against the counter-revolution. Thus history does not tell us whether continuation of the Arbenz reforms would in the long run have eliminated the second danger—the subsequent opposition of the early beneficiaries themselves.

This drag on reform emanating from the "new conservatives" appears very clearly in the Mexican Revolution. Only fifteen years after the administration of the revolutionary General Obregon and five years after the enactment of the agrarian measures of President Cárdenas, the reform process broke off half way with the rise to power of the new bourgeoisie in the administration of Miguel Aleman. Today, despite the fact that in the 1950's Mexico had one of the world's highest industrial and agricultural growth rates, there is little doubt that the country is in a blind alley because of failure to solve its land problem. Mexico's agrarian reform was the most far reaching in Latin America before Cuba's and one which really did incorporate the peasants into national life. Nevertheless, the majority of Mexico's peasants in the *ejidos* are without resources, while the famed economic growth concentrated in the capital and the seven sparsely settled northern states encourages here, as elsewhere in Latin America, speculative monoculture for export and gains tremendous earnings for the children of the Revolution. For example, the son of the same General Obregon

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

is now governor of one of the northern states and the owner of more than 7,500 acres of land irrigated at government expense. The gap between the capital and the seven northern states on the one hand and the rest of the country on the other keeps growing, while the class distribution of income becomes more and more unequal. Thus, it appears that in Mexico, no less than in those countries of Latin America which have not even started their land reforms, the standard of living of the poor is going down. And that same social mobility which is both cause and effect of the integration of the peasants into national life often turns them into conservatives whose interests are opposed to the extension of the same benefits to others.*

Other land reforms, such as those of Eastern Europe after World War I, of Bolivia, and of Egypt, confirm the dangers of the second type. In each case, reform governments proceeded more or less along the lines often proposed by progressives today. The reforms were introduced slowly within the existing structure of society, and the foundations of the power of the conservatives were left intact. I do not think it is an exaggeration to say that to date all of these attempts at land reform have failed, and it is to be expected that future attempts of the second type will likewise fail.

The experience of those countries which have had successful land reforms also attests to the faults of the second and the need for the third type of reform. The outstanding examples of relative success with land reform are to be found in the socialist countries. In China and Cuba, for example, the entire structure of society was, of course, changed at the very beginning, at the same time that the land reform was initiated. This change was effected, significantly, by mobilizing the peasants themselves, and the ability of the conservatives to oppose the reforms was cut off at the root by the elimination of the sources of their power. It is true that Japan and Taiwan have had a measure of success with land reforms without at the same time radically altering the structure of their societies. But these are the kinds of exceptions which prove the rule. In

*For a fuller discussion of the Mexican case, see Andrew Gunder Frank, "Mexico: the Janus Faces of 20th Century Bourgeois Revolution," *MR,* November, 1962.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

both cases, the reforms were put through relatively quickly and under the authority of an occupying military power. In these circumstances, the strength of the conservative opposition was effectively neutralized.

It might seem that as far as Latin America is concerned, the change in social structure and the elimination of conservative power which are the distinguishing features of the third type of reform would result automatically from the liquidation of the *latifundismo,* often described as a feudal or semi-feudal institution. This seems to be the way matters are seen by the architects of the Alliance for Progress. But reality is different. Although it is true that there still exist landowning sectors in Latin America which might be called feudal or semi-feudal, and that there are landowners who still hold provincial political power, it is not the case that these groups are the politically decisive ones at the national level in any Latin American country. There, political and economic power is in the hands of others—of the domestic bourgeoisies of commerce, banking, and industry, and of the great foreign corporations.

These are the important conservers of the status quo; and they and the feudal-type landowners still mutually serve each other's interests in many Latin American countries. The capitalists who have ultimate power permit the "feudalists" to survive, thus sacrificing some rural markets. But in return the feudalists, by monopolizing the land and controlling the provinces, supply the capitalists with a cheap labor force, a conservative legislature and executive, and general political "stability" and quiet in the backyard. But, as the example of Mexico so clearly shows, elimination of the feudalists does not essentially change anything because it leaves intact the power of the capitalist bourgeoisie to oppose more far-reaching agricultural reforms. This power indeed is actually enhanced if, as is usually proposed, compensation for their lands permits the feudalists to convert themselves into capitalists.

The view that Latin America is, in the words of the famous Mexican progressive novelist Carlos Fuentes, "a feudal castle with a capitalist facade" beclouds reality. The measures which the Alliance for Progress wishes to introduce, and which it hopes will substitute capitalism for feudalism, already have

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

a century and a half of failure behind them in Latin America. It would be more accurate to say that Latin America is a capitalist castle with a feudal facade. Breaking the facade would not accomplish much, not even a land reform.

To summarize: land reform of the first type, for the benefit largely of the landowners themselves, is no reform at all. Land reform of the second type, undertaken largely by the bourgeoisie in its own interest, also holds little promise. Only land reform accompanied by a socialist transformation of society really works and is worthy of the name. Effective land reform cannot be made by conservatives or even against conservatives. It can be made only *without* conservatives.

It is estimated that 2,500,000 men, women and children [in Mexico] make a substandard livelihood out of growing and processing the plants on 380,000 hectares of land. Mr. de la Cerda said that their per-capita income was now about 8 cents (United States) daily and that a family survived because all its members—usually six to eight—were working.

—New York Times, November 23, 1962

The real challenge to the United States is how to promote this trend towards a better future for all humanity . . . to ease the contrast between its own abundance and the poverty of mankind elsewhere. Let me cite one glaring instance. In Asia, Africa and Latin America, the living standards have largely remained stationary, or have even declined. Throughout the last decade, the fall in the price of raw materials, while priming the affluent societies of the West, has not only cancelled out the sum total of Western aid, but in many cases has led to an absolute drop in national income. One great lesson of this phenomena is that the world will not live in harmony so long as two-thirds of its inhabitants find difficulty in living at all.

—U Thant

Monstrous injustices, such as racial persecution, and in some colonial territories the virtual enslavement of a great part of the population, will not be for ever endured. Unless they can be remedied peacefully, they will erupt into war.

—Dr. Nkrumah

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE GREAT DEBATE: A REPLY TO BARAN AND SWEEZY

BY ANATOLY BUTENKO

Having read the articles by Paul A. Baran and by Paul M. Sweezy in the May 1, 1962, issue of MONTHLY REVIEW, I would like to tell your readers about my objections to many of the theories advanced by the authors.*

Concerning the Personality Cult, "Stalinism," and "De-Stalinization"

There is hardly any need to prove that the attention of the 22nd Congress of the CPSU was mainly focused on the Program of the Party, on building communism in the USSR. The authors of the above-mentioned articles, however, do not refer to this but devote their attention chiefly to the struggle against the consequences of Stalin's personality cult. Naturally, that is a big and important question. And the authors could not be blamed too severely for their one-sided representation, had they outlined the essence of the personality cult and its causes correctly. Unfortunately, that is not so.

In condemning the personality cult and its consequences, the 22nd Congress of the CPSU, like the 20th Congress, had in mind very definite facts: the glorification, abhorrent to Marxism-Leninism, of Stalin's person and of his imaginary and genuine merits, and the serious mistakes and distortions in domestic and foreign policy that were connected with this. In other words, these were phenomena as alien to Soviet society as a malignant tumor is to a healthy body.

Baran and Sweezy present all this in a different light. They apply the very ambiguous expression "Stalinism" to both positive and negative, necessary and accidental aspects of the past

---

Anatoly Butenko is a Master of Science (Philosophy) and a Lecturer in Philosophy at Moscow University.

*The articles referred to are Paul A. Baran, "A Few Thoughts on the Great Debate," and Paul M. Sweezy, "The 22nd Congress and International Socialism."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

history of the USSR. They speak of "Stalinism" as of something *inevitable,* and declare that "Stalin's basic policies" are necessary in the period of socialist industrialization of relatively underdeveloped countries.

Here, two quite different issues have been either accidentally or purposely confused.

Every country which embarks on the road of socialism with a relatively low level of economic development meets with its own objective difficulties in building up a highly developed economy. A well developed economy does not fall from the sky, it is created by the strenuous efforts of millions of people, and demands certain material sacrifices on their part. The capitalist encirclement of the Soviet Union, the threat of aggression by the fascist countries forced the Soviet people to accelerate the process of industrialization, which made the natural difficulties particularly palpable.

Quite a different matter are the abuse of power, the unjustified repressions, the violation of socialist law, the excessive centralism, and other distortions of the period of the personality cult. Such facts are not born of the conditions of socialist construction in general, or of the specific conditions of development of economically underdeveloped countries. They were certainly not called for by the building of socialism in the USSR.

To confuse the policy of industrialization, the difficulties of the building of socialism, with the distortions permitted during the period of Stalin's personality cult, and to lump these two quite different issues together under the designation of "Stalinism" means, to quote Sweezy, to regard "Stalinism as the inevitable political and ideological superstructure," i.e., to uphold a view which "fitted neatly into the requirements of bourgeois propaganda." Voluntarily or not, the authors grant an indulgence to the arbitrary rule, the violation of socialist law, the unjustified repressions which took place during the period of the Stalin personality cult.

Hence, the problem of abolishing the consequences of the personality cult also is quite different from the appearance Baran and Sweezy try to give it. It is not a question of transition from "the basic policies" of industrialization to methods of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"liberalization and rejuvenation." It is not at all a question of completing socialist reconstruction, urgent for some countries and not urgent for others, but of hard work to clear the Communist movement of everything that was superimposed on it by the personality cult.

This cleansing is necessary for the Marxist-Leninist parties of all countries, because the consequences of the personality cult interfere with Communists at all stages of social development, and undoubtedly impede progress. After the 20th Congress of the CPSU, the Communist and Workers' Parties condemned Stalin's personality cult and began the struggle for the abolition of its harmful consequences.

The Relations Between the Socialist Countries

It is the opinion of Baran (and of Sweezy too) that the development of the socialist countries inevitably gives rise to contradictions and differences. The insurmountable cause of these contradictions and differences at present, they claim, is that the socialist countries, owing to their uneven development and asynchronous socialist revolutions, are now at different stages of economic maturity. Therefore the peoples of the less developed countries in comparing their conditions with the life of the peoples who have gone ahead, "can hardly fail to experience," writes Baran, "the strong sense of estrangement which 'have nots' usually develop towards the 'haves.'"

No one will dispute the statement that the socialist countries are at different stages of economic development, that each of them has its own specific internal conditions. But to draw the conclusion of the *inevitability* of a "sense of estrangement," of profound contradictions and differences between the socialist countries, means to confuse the major issues with the minor, to over-emphasize questions of secondary importance, to take the shadow for the substance.

Naturally, the specific internal conditions in any socialist country influence the development of that country, its economic and political evolution. In one country, industrialization is problem No. 1, in another an industrial base had been built already under capitalism; in one country problems of national relations are of major importance, in another immense im-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

portance attaches to the liberation of territories occupied by the imperialists, etc. These are shades of difference in economic and political aspirations within the limits of the movement towards a common aim; different accents in the general criticism of opposing positions are also possible and probable in the big community of socialist countries, just as in the friendliest family different members always have their own cares, hopes, and accordingly different shades of opinion.

The chief thing, however, is not that. It is that each socialist country, all the nations building socialism and communism, in addition to their specific problems, have basic, and what is most important, common, coinciding interests. The socialist countries have the same type of economic foundation—social ownership of the means of production; the same type of state system—the power belongs to the people, headed by the working class; a common ideology—Marxism-Leninism; common interests in the defense of revolutionary gains and national independence; a common aim—communism.

This socio-economic and political community is of far greater importance than any of the various shades of difference in the approach to political and economic problems. The common, radical interests of the peoples who are building a new life inevitably weld the socialist countries in a fraternal alliance, make their growing unity an historical necessity, a reality.

Shades of difference in economic and political aspirations can turn into issues of principle only if the leaders of a socialist country pursue an erroneous, nationalistic, non-Marxist policy. In that case, the national interests, wrongly interpreted, may become the source of sharp contradictions due to the replacement of primary aims by secondary ones, of international by nationalistic interests. In other words, they will be a proof of the accidental, and not regular, nature of such contradictions.

To present this anomaly as an inevitable trend, as Baran does, to assert that the different level of economic and political development of different socialist countries provides "ample room for differences of opinion and for more or less violent controversy," means an orientation towards the secondary and not the primary aim. It also means presenting possible feeble

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

nationalistic impulses as an actual law governing the relations between socialist countries.

The 22nd Congress of the CPSU declared that "in the nature of the socialist system there are no objective reasons for contradictions and conflicts between the peoples and states belonging to it, its development proceeds in the direction of ever greater unity of countries and nations, the consolidation of all forms of cooperation between them."

This cooperation has now reached a new level. I have in mind the decisions of the June meeting of representatives of the Communist and Workers' Parties of the member countries of the Council for Mutual Economic Aid. The meeting decided to strengthen the coordination of national economic plans and to strive for further extension and correct structuring of the international socialist division of labor. The perfection of the system of cooperation of socialist countries creates a favorable soil for closer relations of all kinds between the socialist nations. This perfection helps gradually to even the levels of development of the socialist countries, and at the same time promotes the economic growth of the socialist system as a whole.

Concerning the Soviet Union's Attitude to the Revolutionary Movement

The USSR has been and remains the standard-bearer of the revolutionary rejuvenation of the modern world. In the articles by Baran and Sweezy this clear and indisputable fact is distorted into something obscure.

Baran and Sweezy have started a "great debate" on the question of the Soviet Union's attitude to the prospects of the revolutionary struggle. Baran asserts that the Soviet Union has ceased to be the inspirer of the revolutionary movement. He argues that the falling away of the underdeveloped countries from capitalism may "place the Soviet Union before the terrible dilemma of either providing large-scale economic aid, or losing face in the underdeveloped world and in the international socialist movement." Sweezy maintains that this is so and not so. His argument is that "as the Soviet Union catches up with and surpasses the developed capitalist countries, Moscow may once again become the spiritual and moral leader of an

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

international socialist movement, this time centered not in the underdeveloped areas of the world but in the advanced countries of Western Europe and North America."

This whole debate between Baran and Sweezy is scholastic, for it is based on a false dilemma: either the Soviet Union, while helping the "East," decelerates its economic growth and ceases to inspire the workers of the "West;" or, on the other hand, abandoning the "East," it steps up economic development and sets an example to the countries of the "West." This dilemma does not confront the Soviet Union; it is the fruit of a false conception of the socialist revolution. In whatever country socialism appears, it is the result of the internal development of that country, of its revolutionary forces.

Wherever socialism is established, it awakens the wide popular masses to activity, develops their initiative and enthusiasm, i.e., sets into motion forces which, with the help of the internal resources, can rapidly rejuvenate the life of the country.

Countering this, Baran and Sweezy seek to create the impression that the countries which have embarked on the road of socialism are developing slowly, that their economic level will remain fairly low for a long time to come. But do these statements coincide with the facts? Of course not. They can be easily refuted by the examples of all the countries of the socialist system and, in particular, of the socialist countries of Asia which have attained great successes in economic and cultural development in a short period of time. I should also like to emphasize that the growing cooperation among the socialist countries, mentioned above, creates opportunities for granting economic assistance on an ever wider scale to the young states.

Of course, a country embarking on the road of socialism needs the international support of the other socialist countries. But it should not be forgotten that it is a question of international *support* for an independently developing revolutionary movement, for independent socialist construction. Between the efforts of the people of any given country and international assistance there lies a distinct dividing line, determined by the interests of general revolutionary progress.

To utilize internal resources to the full in order to build

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

up the national economy is of tremendous importance not only for the country building socialism. In thus developing their economy and culture, the people of this country are carrying out their international duty, promoting successes of socialism in the whole world.

The socialist revolution is not an item of "export" and "import." It is the result of the efforts of the people of the given country, who have hoisted the banner of freedom. Therefore socialist mutual assistance pursues no other aims than that of facilitating the efforts of the fraternal people in their struggle to build socialism and communism.

As for the Soviet Union, to all countries building socialism and communism, it will always be the country which was first to pave the way to socialism, and first to test the laws which will guide the development of all other countries. The Soviet Union's prestige as the vanguard of the revolutionary movement, the prestige of the country which first built socialism and is now successfully building communism, cannot be disputed, just as the history of mankind cannot be cancelled.

REJOINDER

BY PAUL A. BARAN AND PAUL M. SWEEZY

One of the many fortunate by-products of de-Stalinization (or liquidation of the "personality cult," if terminology matters) is the progressive disappearance of obstacles to an active participation of socialists in the Soviet Union and other socialist countries in the vitally important discussion of the theoretical and practical problems confronting the international socialist movement. We therefore welcome Anatoly Butenko's communication as a harbinger of what we hope will develop into a fruitful and mutually beneficial exchange of ideas.

What are the objections raised by Butenko to our articles? As far as we can see, there are four:

(1) He considers it improper to discuss the 22nd Congress

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of the CPSU without giving full consideration to the new Party Program which was debated and adopted by the Congress. Had we set out to write a comprehensive account of the transactions and resolutions of the Congress, the omission of a thorough (and critical) analysis of that most important document would indeed be inexcusable. It so happens, however, that neither of our essays had any such ambitious purpose. As stated in the editorial introduction, they were written as contributions to a symposium organized by the Italian periodical *Nuovi Argomenti* (and later published in its July-October, 1962, issue), and their objective was the modest one of presenting reflections on a few of the issues raised by the Congress. Accordingly both articles discuss certain aspects of the Program without even referring to other, perhaps even more important, ones. It surely cannot be Butenko's view that one is bound either to discuss everything that happened at the Congress or else refrain from commenting upon it at all.

(2) Butenko thinks it is wrong for us to "speak of 'Stalinism' as something *inevitable,* and [to] declare that 'Stalin's basic policies' are necessary in the period of socialist industrialization of relatively underdeveloped countries" (Butenko's emphasis); and he accuses us of "accidentally or purposely" confusing two issues—one being the "policy of industrialization, the difficulties of building of socialism," and the other "the abuses of power, the unjustified repressions, the violation of socialist law, the excessive centralism and other distortions of the period of the personality cult." He is perfectly right: there *are* two issues. But far from "accidentally or purposely" confusing them, both articles are attempts to separate them out and to distinguish clearly between them. Thus Sweezy writes: "Stalinism has two meanings: on the one hand, the system of extreme centralization, tight discipline, and economic 'forced marches'; on the other hand, the glorification of the leader, the abuses of power, blind intellectual dogmatism, etc." And Baran asks: "Does the formal and irreversible break with, and the uncompromising condemnation of, the entire complex of repression, violence, and dogmatism which constituted a prominent feature of Stalin's domination in the socialist part of the world call also for an equally decisive change in the strategy of socialist construc-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tion adopted under his leadership?" Where is the confusion discerned by Butenko? More important, where in our articles do we speak of Stalinist abuses of power, unjustified repressions, violations of socialist legality, etc., as being an "inevitable" accompaniment of socialist industrialization of relatively underdeveloped countries? Again, Baran merely notes that such a view is held by one wing, the "revisionist" wing, of the international socialist movement without at any point himself subscribing to it; and Sweezy takes explicit exception to it, characterizing it as fitting "neatly into the requirements of bourgeois propaganda."

Yet—and this we believe is the crux of the matter—the necessity to differentiate sharply between the policy of accelerated industrialization and the belt-tightening and sacrifices associated with it on the one hand, and the regime of violence and terror instituted by Stalin on the other does not mean, as Butenko apparently thinks, that the two have nothing to do with each other. To put the issue in the simplest possible terms: while forced industrialization can be (and from what we know about China, is actually being) carried out without a reign of terror, could a reign of terror develop and entrench itself as it did in the Soviet Union in the absence of forced industrialization? Would it have been possible for a man even as power-greedy and evil as Stalin seems to have been to attain the position that he held, were it not for the economic stringencies, the capitalist encirclement, and the threat of invasion that beset his country? At no point did we argue that this objective situation necessarily gave rise to all that goes under the name of the "cult of personality." What we did argue and what we still believe is that the specific circumstances prevailing in the Soviet Union during the decade preceding and the decade following World War II set the stage for the rise to power of a man like Stalin, made it possible for him to dispose of all of his opponents, opened the door to such individuals as Yezhov, Beria, Bagirov, Dekanosov, and the like. If Butenko denies this, then he is not only taking a long step back to some "great (or evil) man" theory of history; much more serious, he is implicitly assuming that a revival of a Stalin-type despotism is possible even in entirely different

(*continued on page* 674)

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

SELECCIONES DE

We print below an announcement which is being sent (in Spanish) to prospective Latin American subscribers to SELECCIONES DE MONTHLY REVIEW, soon to be published regularly in Buenos Aires. Vol. I, No. 1 is tentatively scheduled for May, 1963. Since our return to the U.S., we have heard from what we may somewhat grandly refer to as *MR's* Buenos Aires office that the new project is already off to a promising start. A group of university students have organized a "stuffing party" to send out thousands of announcements, and the latest report on the number of subscribers signed up was 300 (Vol. I, No. 1 of *MR* went to only 400 subscribers). We must confess that we originally had many misgivings about the feasibility of the project, but we found great interest everywhere we went in Latin America, and we are now convinced that it can be a success. Liliane Martin and Irene Mizrahi, who will translate and edit the Spanish edition, are first-rate translators and have the necessary energy and enthusiasm to overcome whatever obstacles may arise now or in the future. But they will need as much help as they can get, especially of the financial variety. We are sending them as much as we think the *MR* treasury can stand, and we would like to invite any readers who want to help launch the Spanish edition to send us your contributions. We will forward the money to BA.—THE EDITORS

In its fourteen years of existence, *Monthly Review's* readership outside the United States has steadily expanded; and today the ratio of foreign to domestic readers is probably as high as, or perhaps higher than, that of any other magazine published in the United States. There are, however, obvious limits to the growth of circulation in countries where English is not a language in common use. To breach these limits, friends in Latin America have long since proposed that, following the examples of such contemporaries as *Time* and *Reader's Digest*, *MR* should publish a Spanish-language edition.

Until recently, we have not been able to devise workable arrangements for such a venture. Now, however, we are happy and proud to announce that in a short time the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

first issue of *MR* in Spanish will be published in Buenos Aires and widely distributed in the other Latin American countries. This is made possible by the cooperation and assistance of many people, but above all by the initiative and enterprise of our able and charming translators, Liliane Martin and Irene Mizrahi, who will be fully responsible for the publication and circulation of the Spanish edition and with whom we look forward to a long and fruitful collaboration.

Readers of *MR* are familiar with our efforts to report upon and interpret the Cuban Revolution, one of the epoch-making events of the 20th century. The launching of the Spanish edition coincides with an extension of this effort to the rest of Latin America. We are confident that the new contacts and channels of information opened up by the Spanish edition will greatly facilitate this task of extending our area of coverage and interpretation.

At the same time, however, we want to make clear that *MR*'s primary job is and will remain to interpret the reality of United States capitalist society both in its domestic and foreign aspects. That all the world needs a reliable guide to this reality will, we think, be conceded by everyone. In the final analysis, our success will be measured by the way we meet this need.

We take this opportunity to thank Liliane Martin and Irene Mizrahi and to wish them success in the difficult undertaking on which they are embarking. It should hardly be necessary to add that everything depends on the circulation achieved. If you believe that a Spanish edition of *MR* can make an important contribution to the development of a better society in the Americas and in the rest of the world, then you will certainly want to subscribe and help in every way open to you.

Leo Huberman
Paul M. Sweezy

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

(*continued from page* 671)
historical circumstances. Butenko ought to realize that such a theory fits even more neatly into the requirements of bourgeois propaganda against socialism. And against such a conception we must, indeed, protest most strongly. We have always preferred historical materialism to an anything-can-happen theory of history, and we continue to believe that political, social, and cultural phenomena such as the occurrence of the "cult of personality" must be understood and explained rather than merely decried and deplored.

It is important to recognize that extremely important practical issues are involved in what at first sight appears to be an abstract theoretical debate. Those who hold that the horrors of Stalinism are inevitable consequences of a serious all-out effort to develop an underdeveloped country quite naturally tend to oppose such a course. They content themselves with advocating various reforms which are likely to remain abortive, leaving undisturbed the essence of a pernicious system and betraying all the aspirations of the poverty-stricken and oppressed. It is otherwise with those who consider Stalinist abuses to have been mere historical accidents caused by the fortuitous rise to power of evil men. Their tendency is to evade the issue, or else to solve it by incantation—by exhorting revolutionary movements to select virtuous leaders. They tend to substitute the cult of "bad" personality for the cult of "good" personality, forgetting that under certain historical circumstances "good" personalities can easily turn into "bad" ones.

Our view is altogether different. We believe that revolutions, especially when combined with forced economic marches, create conditions conducive to excessive political repression, to abuses of power, to unnecessary curtailment of individual freedoms. The remedy, however, is not to be found in selection of good leaders, important though that certainly is, but in the preservation of popular control over leaders, in maintaining and extending the democratic institutions and civil liberties of the working people, in confining repression to active counter-revolutionaries. This was the policy advocated by Marx and Engels; it was the policy practiced under the most trying and difficult circumstances by the Russian Bolsheviks during Lenin's

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

life time; it is the policy being practiced in Cuba today. It seems to us that it has never been more necessary than it is now for socialists to insist on this policy of revolutionary democracy, and to combine this insistence with a careful analysis of all the obstacles that stand in the path of its realization.

(3) Turning to relations between socialist countries, Butenko rejects our contention that the uneven development of individual socialist countries is bound to give rise to contradictions and differences. Yet in arguing against it he mixes up a number of things. In the first place, it is necessary to differentiate clearly between the broad historical perspective and the short-run outlook. As far as the former is concerned, there is no disagreement between us and Butenko. Writing a year ago, one of us stated:

> Taking the risks which always attach to prophecy, I would venture the opinion that in spite of all the heat generated in the current debate and all the sharp arrows flying back and forth between the protagonists, the conflict will not inflict irreparable harm on the cause of socialism. In the longer run the fundamental identity of the relations of production prevailing in the socialist countries will prove to be a more powerful factor than the temporary discrepancies among their leaderships on short-run strategy and tactics. Just as the socialist mode of production survived all the abhorrent doings of Stalin, so the socialist revolutions in China and elsewhere remain irreversible historical facts which cannot be altered, let alone annulled, by whatever frictions and disagreements may temporarily shake their political superstructures. Compromises are possible and will probably be arrived at. But even should the socialist governments of the countries involved fail to arrive at a mutually acceptable *modus vivendi,* the resulting estrangement need neither prevent the continuous progress of the individual countries on the road to socialism, nor preclude their cohesion and solidarity in the fullness of time.*

When it comes to the immediate future, however, the situation is quite different. That at the present time contradictions and differences exist is not a matter of theoretical argument but of fact. And again it would seem to us that the task of Marxists in the Soviet Union, in the United States, and everywhere else is not simply to condemn and to regret the

*Paul A. Baran, *The Political Economy of Growth*. Foreword to 1962 Printing, p. XI.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

cropping up of such conflicts, but to employ the powerful method of Marxist analysis in an attempt to clarify their causes, their scope, and their historical significance. This, indeed, is the principal, if not the only, contribution that Marxist theorists can make to the amelioration of these conflicts and to preventing them from developing into major rifts with possibly dangerous consequences. That the necessity for such an analysis is also recognized in the Soviet Union can be seen from the programmatic editorial published in *Pravda* of February 10th, 1963. There we read:

> We must not leave out of account that our countries began the transition to socialism from different levels of economic, political, and cultural development and still find themselves in different stages of the struggle for socialism and communism. Each country has its own concrete experience in the area of international relations; not altogether equal is each country's responsibility for the solution of various international problems. It is not precluded that this may become a source of different interpretations of concrete problems of socialist construction, a source of uneven approaches to various questions of contemporary life. Moreover we must look ahead and consider that when tens of other countries in Europe, Asia, Africa, America, Australia enter the road of transition to socialism, they will undoubtedly contribute much of their own to the solution of questions of socialist construction.

It seems obvious to us, however, that the need for a thorough study and comprehension of such differences in interpretations and approaches among socialist countries is not recognized in Butenko's statement that: "Shades of difference in economic and political aspirations can turn into issues of principle only if the leaders of a socialist country pursue an erroneous, nationalistic, non-Marxist policy." Here we meet again Butenko's propensity to interpret historical events in terms of a good-guys-versus-bad-guys theory.

We do not claim that our interpretation of the relevant facts and relations was necessarily correct. What we do claim is that genuine progress in socialist thought can be attained only by serious exploratory and interpretative efforts rather than by substituting wishful thinking for the study of reality or by classifying and labeling events according to whether they hap-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

pen to fit into one's preconceived scheme of how history ought to behave.

(4) Butenko is most severe when castigating us for having "started a 'great debate' on the question of the Soviet Union's attitude to the prospects of the revolutionary struggle." Here Butenko is obviously carried away by his polemical zeal. We need hardly assure him that we were not the ones to "start a great debate," either in the world at large or even among ourselves. Nor did we ever state that "the Soviet Union has ceased to be the inspirer of the revolutionary movement." In this matter, as in those previously discussed, the difference between Butenko and us is that he is apparently content with making a number of ringing statements, while we are seeking to understand the objective conditions which determine, influence, and modify the part played by the Soviet Union, China, Yugoslavia, and other socialist countries in the development of the international socialist movement. For even if it were true—which it certainly is not in a world in which the class struggle has so largely moved into the arena of international relations—that "in whatever country socialism appears, it is the result of the internal developments in that country, of its revolutionary forces," it would be undeniable that the evolution of the socialist camp and the policies adopted by the individual socialist countries exercise a powerful impact on the strength and direction of the revolutionary forces everywhere. It follows that the capacity of the socialist countries to render moral, political, economic, and on occasion military support to new arrivals in the socialist camp is an important, and could be under certain circumstances a decisive factor in determining the fate of a socialist revolution in a particular country. Indeed, where would be Cuba today in the absence of political and economic aid from the Soviet Union? But isn't it obvious that the question whether such aid is given or not is decided not solely by the commitment to international socialist solidarity on the part of the socialist countries but also by their objective political and economic capabilities? Even with the best of intentions, the Soviet Union would have been unable to save the Cuban economy by supplying it with indispensable oil, were it not for the successful development of the Soviet oil industry.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Thus what Butenko has to say on this subject is irrelevant to the arguments advanced in our articles. We did not seek "to create the impression that the countries which have embarked on the road to socialism are developing slowly, that their economic level will remain fairly low for a long time to come." What we did say is that the economic levels in different countries are likely to remain very *different* for some time to come. And what we did try to point out is that these differences, *unless strongly and systematically counteracted by generous assistance to the "have-not's" on the part of the "have's,"* are likely to create and to aggravate frictions and tensions within the socialist camp. Does Butenko really think otherwise?

To repeat: for developments unfavorable to the unity and the success of the international socialist movement to be minimized and for the worst to be avoided, realities need to be frankly faced and intelligently dealt with. They cannot be conjured away by professions of good will, by declarations of revolutionary solidarity, and devotion to the cause of socialism. There is no substitute for conscientious and dispassionate Marxist analysis.

PAMPHLET PACKET $3

Why Socialism? by Albert Einstein	20¢
Principles of Communism by Engels (trans. by Paul M. Sweezy)	25¢
Problems of Disarmament by Hans A. Bethe and Others	35¢
Waste in American Medicine by a Committee of Physicians	35¢
Socialism Is the Only Answer by Huberman and Sweezy	35¢
Marxian Socialism; and Power Elite or Ruling Class? by Sweezy	35¢
The Theory of U. S. Foreign Policy by Sweezy and Huberman	35¢
Reflections on the Cuban Revolution by Paul A. Baran	50¢
The ABC of Socialism by Huberman and May	50¢
Economic Development, Planning, And International Cooperation by Oskar Lange	50¢
British Guiana by Ved Prakash Vatuk	50¢
Total	$4.20

PAMPHLET PACKET SPECIAL

All the above pamphlets $3

Send your order, with payment enclosed, to

Monthly Review Press 333 Sixth Avenue New York 14, N. Y.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

WORLD EVENTS

By Scott Nearing

European Unity and the Common Market

"European unity" is more than a diplomatic slogan. It has become an essential precondition for the survival of Europe as a major center of world power.

Well equipped climatically, with a generous endowment of material resources, a population conditioned to the disciplines needed for automation and a high level of productive capacity, Europe should be able to function as one of the three or four continental power concentrations. Such indeed it was during the four centuries from 1500 to 1900.

One major obstacle lay in the way of unified European action: the savage struggle for power which helped to dismember the Roman Empire and which has continued to dominate European public life ever since Christendom united to save the Holy Sepulchre from the desecration of infidel control.

Localism held Europe in a firm grip despite repeated attempts by Charlemagne, Gustavus Adolphus, Frederick the Great, Napoleon, and other would-be European masters to bring the feuding continent under one political authority. Even during the 19th century, though equipped increasingly with such unifying forces as speedy communication, cheap transportation, multiplying international trade, commerce, travel, and extensive cultural interchange, Europeans clung steadfastly to their localisms, crystallized within relatively limited national frontiers.

Europe's best effort toward unification during the 19th century was in rival power blocs which hacked each other to pieces in a succession of destructive wars that climaxed in the free-for-alls of 1914-1918 and 1939-1945. This historical experience leads to an inescapable conclusion: capitalist Europe

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

is more interested in division and survival-conflict than in unification.

Efforts to unite Europe and the world, embodied in the League of Nations, the United Nations, and lesser groupings such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Organization for European Economic Cooperation, have been only partially successful though they have had generous political and economic backing, especially from the United States.

Faced with the rapid growth and expansion of socialist construction around the Moscow-Peking axis, Western statesmen have come face to face with a hard choice: unite or retire into the political shadows. Recent efforts to set up a European economic community and some form of political integration are responses to that challenge.

During the past dozen years these efforts have borne fruit in a stream of conferences and in several economic and political organizations of which the European Economic Community or Common Market has become the most outstanding.

Traditional French-British and French-German rivalries have been pushed under the table in the pursuit of unity, but they keep bobbing up. The latest example is the bitter sessions held in Brussels during January, 1963, to discuss the admission of Britain to the Common Market. After three years of painstaking negotiations, the Brussels sessions adjourned with France vetoing Britain's admission.

Speaking for a France which recently had voted him a free hand, President Charles de Gaulle said bluntly in the course of a press interview that Britain did not belong in the European Common Market because it was not really a part of Europe and because it was cooperating too closely with the United States. As for the United States, General de Gaulle added, Europeans could hardly accept its leadership because in the Cuban crisis of October, 1962, the United States had brought its European allies to the verge of nuclear war without so much as notifying them or consulting them regarding the dangerous policy it was following.

France's veto ended the Brussels discussions. Britain was excluded from the Common Market and the United States was warned to keep its distance.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Among the countries directly represented at the Brussels talks there were and are outstanding divergencies. West Germany wishes to restore European national frontiers as they were before 1939 or, in some cases, before 1914. France aims to regain the grandeur which the country enjoyed under Louis XIV. Britain hopes to recover at least a part of the ascendancy which it held at the beginning of the present century. Washington, though not directly represented at Brussels, stands to lose heavily as a result of this latest breakaway from Western European joint action. United States policy since 1946 has been built around the assumption of a strong, united Central and Western Europe presenting an impassable barrier to the westward sweep of socialism. Western Europe, disunited, bickering and quarreling, will fall an easy prey to the anti-capitalist drive of socialist planners and builders.

Also represented indirectly at Brussels, the Vatican relies on Central and Western Europe to hold back socialism and Communism. It also has plans for a federation of Central and Southern European Catholic states drawing their ideological leadership from the Mother Church in Rome.

Dry bones of the 19th century empires, grouped in EEC or NATO evidently remain dry bones that cannot recover their lost vitality, nor need they be taken seriously by the socialists who occupy Eastern Europe.

Failure of the private enterprisers at Brussels has opened the way for the collectivists to make the next effort to unify Europe. Collectivists in the Soviet Union and the eight other socialist countries of Eastern Europe occupy half of Europe's land surface and are populated by about half of the European total. From this auspicious beginning it should be possible for them, in easy, well-chosen stages, to proceed with the unification of a socialist Europe.

Mali, the Cuba of Africa?

Associated Press analyst, William L. Ryan, writes excitedly that African Mali is "a people's democracy in embryo. It can provide a solid base for the Russians in West Africa, similar to the Western Hemisphere foothold Moscow now has in Cuba." In Bamoko, capital of Mali, "The big wheels call each other

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

'comrade.' They say they are building socialism. . . . Moscow has extended substantial credits to Mali. So has Czechoslovakia. Mali has a commercial agreement with Red China. . . . The Russians are pressing Guinea and Mali to accept a Soviet program of railway modernization." Mali leftist leaders are linked with a leftist organization called "Union of African States."

This story will be "news" to some Westerners. Really it is old hat. Twenty years ago, in 1943, South Africa's Marshall Jan Smuts told the Western world that Africa was going Communist because of its solid Communist background. Common ownership of land and animals, common direction of tribal and village affairs, sharing according to need are features of Communism and are anathema to individualistic private enterprise. After a century of exposure to Western economic and political ideas, Africa is brushing off capitalism as it would any other annoyance and is accepting forms of collectivism that are fully in line with its historical background.

What Price Freedom?

Late in December, 1962, President Kennedy reviewed the veterans of the Bay of Pigs invasion. The review took place in Miami. It was a formal affair. The Brigade presented its flag to the President. In response, the President made this pledge: "I can assure you that this flag will be returned to this Brigade in a free Havana." The President added: "On behalf of my government and my country, I welcome you to the United States. I bring you my nation's respect for your courage and for your cause. . . . Your conduct and valor are proof that although Castro and his fellow dictators may rule nations, they do not rule people. . . . All men who fight for freedom are our brothers, and shall be until your country and others are free."

Texts of this speech carried by the Associated Press show that President Kennedy, in the course of a brief address, used the word "freedom" nine times and the word "free" twenty times. What is this "freedom" that Kennedy wants to restore to the Cuban people? For many years, until 1958, under Batista, the economy and the political life of Cuba were under the heel of Yankee business men and politicos. For over half a century a Yankee military base has been maintained on the island, and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the shadow of this foreign military occupation is a violation of the sovereignty of the Cuban people.

What price this freedom?

Colonials Speak For Themselves

Half a century ago the English economist, J.A. Hobson, and some of his contemporaries in Western Europe were analyzing imperialism. A few years later, V.I. Lenin and his comrades in the socialist camp were denouncing the imperialists and calling on the peoples to end imperialism and inaugurate socialism. Such analyses and anti-imperialist exhortations came chiefly from Europe, homeland of the 19th century's planet-girdling empires. Imperialism's victims, who made up at least two thirds of mankind, protested and organized anti-imperialist demonstrations and revolts; but when it came to theory and programming they were either voiceless or as unsure as Dr. Sun Yat Sen in his *Three Principles*.

Anti-imperialists among the colonials today are speaking up. In 1962, Professor Hector Malava Mata and three of his associates at the Central University of Caracas, Venezuela, brought out a study entitled *Petroleo y Desarrollo Economica de Venezuela* (Ediciones Pensamiento Vivo, Caracas). The authors are economists and have made an extensive study of the consequences to the Venezuelan economy of having petroleum resources exploited by concession-holding foreign capitalists. Harvey O'Connor, in his two books on the oil industry published by Monthly Review Press (*The Empire of Oil* and *World Crisis in Oil*), has discussed the general issue. The Venezuelan economists have dealt with its implications for one Latin American country. They wrote:

> The confrontation of riches and poverty formulated by Marx provides a methodological contribution of extraordinary usefulness, not only for the analysis of the international disequilibrium among countries and the historical conflict between development and stagnation, but also for the interpretation of the internal inequality in the countries with high rates of growth as well as in the backward economies. In some respects bourgeois society is the great creator of social contradictions. Wealth and its creators are positive and negative poles of the social contradiction.

This juxtaposition of wealth and poverty appears in the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

relations between developed, rich, capital-exploiting countries and underdeveloped, poor "beneficiaries" of foreign investments. "Beneficiaries" appears in quotation marks because the undeveloped countries in which capital is invested actually are benefactors of the developed, rich countries.

Take the Venezuelan petroleum industry as an example. "In fourteen years the foreign investments in petroleum resulted in a net loss to Venezuela of 11,721 million bolivars. Under these conditions no one can deny that Venezuela has been financing the United States, England, and Holland." The authors support this assertion by figures from the Venezuela Ministry of Mines and Hydrocarbons. Beside these Venezuelan payments on foreign investments, the people of Venezuela, in these fourteen years, have lost immense quantities of one of their most important natural resources.

As the petroleum reserves are exhausted, annual depreciation charges of 13.6 percent amortize the capital. In another seven years the foreign exploiters will have taken from Venezuela one of its most vital resources and left in exchange a ghost industry with its second-hand capital equipment.

Economically, foreign investments in Venezuela's petroleum have enriched the investors, with no corresponding advantage accruing to the people of Venezuela. The consequences to Venezuelan political life have been "truly alarming." The intruding presence and the activities of the foreign investors, led by those from the United States, have been disturbing and disruptive of orderly Venezuelan political development.

We hope that this pioneering work by Professor Mata and his colleagues will be followed by equally effective analyses of the effects of imperialist intervention and exploitation on the economies of other Latin American countries.

The fact is that in certain periods of history the masses of the people in some particular country have no other means of escaping from a regime which is intolerable to them except by armed revolt. We must accept this fact and we must also accept the fact that the forces which produce a revolution, a revolt against colonialism or a movement for national unification, can occur at any point of time in history.

—*Dr. Nkrumah*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

BOOKS

SUBMIT OR FIGHT?

BY CONRAD J. LYNN

Black Americans have had to wait a long time to read an authentic account in a novel of what it meant to be a Negro GI in World War II. It took a veteran of the South Pacific to do it. This book* is not for the squeamish. John Oliver Killens follows a group of Northern Negroes from their Jim Crow induction center in the northeast to their Jim Crow training camp in Georgia. From their first day in uniform the Army regimen hacks away at their self-respect; discipline requires dehumanization and, above all, subservience to white officers. Only a tenacious sense of humor makes their lot bearable.

In Georgia one petty humiliation is piled upon another until the main character, Solly Saunders, is battered in a savage attempt to smash his virility in the first terrifying climax in the book. When Ossie Davis read this passage before a hushed audience in the Carnegie Endowment Center a few months ago, the hundreds of black people present simultaneously uttered a sharp shout of such fury that the relatively few whites among them visibly blanched.

Eventually, all the protagonists, and they are a notable crew, reach the official war theatre. The author skillfully portrays the constant debate in the minds of the black soldiers—are their real enemies the Japanese or the whites beside them and at home? A race battle in Australia answers the question.

The love life of Solly Saunders is not neglected. For all the wealth of intimate detail, however, it is apparent that Killens is wrestling with a larger, more pervasive theme in which women are only symbols. Solly's conspicuous success in the bedroom only emphasizes his weakness in the world outside.

Conrad Lynn is a lawyer practicing in New York City. His first notable case was the defense of his brother, Winfred, who fought against serving in a Jim Crow army in World War II.

*John Oliver Killens, *And Then We Heard The Thunder,* Alfred A. Knopf, 1962, $5.95.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Wherever the black man has been forced to live with the white man in Western society a dilemma has faced him. Should he suppress his manhood and survive? Or should he affirm his manhood and die? The grim statistics of the slave trade show that the prouder spirits chose the second alternative. With the maturing of the plantation system in the southern United States, only the desperate slave insurrections attested to the persistence among the Africans of a nostalgia for freedom.

The development of the Afro-American at the base of the social structure reflects the constant presence of this dilemma one hundred years after formal emancipation. For the betterment of economic status on the part of a small portion of the Negroes has not led to his acceptance as an equal in the predominantly paleface society. A Negro millionaire driving to Florida in the winter must still take his sandwich out of the window of the wayside diner and eat in his Cadillac. The deputy sheriff who stops him on the road for some fancied traffic violation still calls him "boy," and when he arrives at his destination he must still take segregated lodgings.

The never-ending debate in the black community over these alternatives has usually found the proponents of the survival line becoming the spokesmen to the white community. Consequently most white people think of Negroes as being basically gentle, polite, fun-loving, artistic, and carefree. And our spokesmen sedulously cultivate this impression. How often have we been in all-Negro bull sessions and a Roy Wilkins or a Bill Dawson has said, "Well, we're still here, ain't we, but where are the Indians?"

The strategy of submission and conciliation has not been confined to the leadership. Because most jobs are controlled by the white man, he has accorded the Negro employment largely as an act of grace. Historically, the black Pullman and dining-car porter has formed the base of the Negro petty bourgeoisie, not only because he was assured of more regular employment but because he was in a position to be constantly the recipient of the "boss man's" largesse.

The white liberals have felt most at ease with the conciliatory wing of Negro leadership. Their self-images have been inflated by their feeling of their own large-mindedness and Christian spirit. The established black leadership can be depended upon to keep violent expressions of discontent to a minimum and even a small amount of social intercourse can be encouraged for the edification of the "free world."

In times of quiet, the galling inferiority of the Negroes' position is endured with only occasional outbursts of resentment. Then, the do-gooder and the pacifist reflect happily that the "good Nigras" are, indeed,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

keeping their more boisterous and rebellious brothers in line. In war, as in revolution, however, the latent abscesses in the social system become inflamed to the point of bursting. John Oliver Killens has chosen as the milieu for his novel of the black man's condition the Second World War. By so doing he has rudely shaken the complacency of the apologists, black and white, of the New Frontier.

For Killens has probed beneath the surface and found that the turmoil is only superficially about lunch counters, PX's and women, about segregated churches and the front ends of buses. All the hallmarks of Jim Crow simply affirm the essential helplessness of the black man in a white-ruled order. He is deprived of power. Why are all the Negro political appointees "asslickers," to use Killens' colorful terminology? Because they must be depended upon to do "Marse Charley's" bidding. Their subservience is far more important than ability. It would be hard to find, for example, a more inept set of judges than the black members of the judiciary in the City of New York. In the past, all Negroes would applaud the political appointment of any black man since this constituted "recognition." Now, however, the same political appointee is regarded with ill-concealed contempt by the blacks and with perplexity by whites.

Any black ex-GI can attest to the stark authenticity of Killens' story from the time Solly Saunders shifted uneasily in the shortarm inspection, with its concentration on nudity and the sexual organs, to the competition with the white soldiers for foreign women. In the process, the ultimate meaning of the ugliness, the humiliations, the savagery is revealed. The struggle is about power. The white man, by virtue of his lack of pigmentation alone, insists that he must always retain superiority over the black man. The black man, even while dying by the hundreds in the race battle with the cracker soldiers in Bainbridge, Australia, knows that he can never accord that superiority again. Racial supremacy connotes not only an assertion by the dominant majority of greater capacity by nature but an acceptance of that assertion by the minority. The black man entered the army saying "if you're white you're right." Those that left were saying "we'll take those m.f's yet."

The world has become much smaller since 1945. The entire continents of Asia and Africa have challenged the myth of white supremacy. And in America, for the first time, a black man, Robert F. Williams, has internationalized the fight of the Afro-American for freedom, and from his exile in Cuba exhorts his fellow Americans, black and white, to orient the struggle of all the North American submerged peoples with the great revolution building up in South America.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

That struggle and that orientation spells the doom of "Fortress America." It spells the doom of white supremacy. No longer is the courageous Negro a Claude McKay—simply fighting back and dying. Now he represents the future, a future that will not be denied.

To stem the tide, the new "black cabinet" met a few weeks ago in Arden House to determine how to channel the response of the black masses to the nationalist upsurges in Africa and in Cuba. The formula distilled out of much scholarship and head-thumping was to send a delegation to the White House and ask Kennedy to appoint more "colored" ambassadors. Jackie Robinson, excluded from the conference as too conservative, applauded the results and called upon Negroes everywhere to write letters to the boss man backing up some more appointments for the asslickers.

What was successful, in part, in Roosevelt's day is completely inadequate now, however. A new black man is coming to maturity who will not sell his birthright for a mess of potage. The adjustment to him will be painful but it must be made.

THE LEGACY OF SLAVERY

BY URSULA WASSERMANN

"The Caribbean has been described as Europe's other sea, the Mediterranean of the New World. It was a Mediterranean which summoned up every dark human instinct without the complementary impulses toward nobility and beauty of older lands, a Mediterranean where civilization turned satanic, perverting those it attracted. And if one considers this sea, which the tourist now enlivens with his fantastic uniform, as a wasteful consumer of men through more than three centuries—the aboriginal population of some millions wiped out; the insatiable plantations; 300,000 slaves taken to Surinam which today has a Negro population of 90,000; the interminable wars: 40,000 British soldiers dead between 1794 and 1796 alone and another 40,000 discharged as unfit—it would seem that simply to have survived in the West Indies is to have triumphed."

Ursula Wassermann, who is now in Argentina, writes regularly for *The National Guardian.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

V. S. Naipaul, Trinidad-born English novelist of Hindu origin has, in the *Middle Passage*, (Andre Deutsch, London, 1962) presented us with a most profound—if also most depressing—description of that incoherent society which is roughly grouped together under the name West Indies and which in the turmoils of the Western Hemisphere will yet prove to be one of its most troubled regions, since "nothing was created" here; "there were only plantations, prosperity, decline, neglect," islands almost entirely populated through the Middle Passage, the name given to the slave-carrying voyages between Africa and the Caribbean.

"Twenty million Africans made the Middle Passage and scarcely an African name remains in the New World. Until the other day African tribesmen on the screen excited derisive West Indian laughter. . . . In the pursuit of the Christian-Hellenic tradition, which some might see as a paraphrase for whiteness, the past has to be denied, the self despised. Black will be made white. The West Indian accepted his blackness as his guilt, and divided people into white, musty, dusty, tea, coffee, cocoa, light black, black, dark black. He never seriously doubted the validity of the prejudices from which he suffered, for he had inherited the prejudices of the culture to which he aspired. In the French territories, he aimed at Frenchness, in the Dutch territories at Dutchness; in the English territories he aimed at simple whiteness, Englishness being impossible."

This desperate desire for identification with the oppressor on the part of the oppressed is typical of colonial peoples at a stage of development which precedes national emancipation. Even nominal independence, as enjoyed by many of the West Indies today, cannot counteract this phenomenon, since independence has been bestowed *from above and not won on* the basis of national struggle. The struggle never took place because the nation had not yet come into existence. "Modernity in Trinidad," writes Naipaul, "means constant alertness, a willingness to change, a readiness to accept everything which films, magazines and comic strips appear to indicate as American. Beauty queens and fashion parades are modern. . . . To be modern is to ignore local products and to use those advertised in American magazines. The excellent coffee which is grown in Trinidad is used only by the very poor and a few middle-class English expatriates. Everyone else drinks Nescafe or Maxwell House or Chase & Sanborn, which is more expensive but is advertised in magazines."

A hundred years earlier, Trollope said of Jamaica, "It is to be remarked that all through the island people are fond of English dishes and that they despise, or affect to despise, their own productions. They will give

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

you oxtail soup when turtle would be much cheaper. Roast-beef and beefsteaks are found at almost every meal. . . . When yams, avocado pears, mountain cabbage, plantains, and twenty other delicious vegetables may be had for the gathering, people will insist on eating bad English potatoes."

I was much reminded of my travels in West Africa, where the markets of Abidjan and Conakry were supplied, by courtesy of *Air France*, with every type of French *primeurs*, with camembert and *saucisson de Lyons*, to the detriment of local produce and to the exhaustion of one's purse. Even in Ghana, two years after independence, it was no easy feat to be served African food and I scoured the country in search of *fufu* and groundnut stew, so much more wholesome than so-called European dishes which, by tradition, were still considered superior. But to quote Trollope again: "The West Indian Negro knows nothing of Africa except that it is a term of reproach. If African immigrants are put to work on the same estate with him, he will not eat with them nor drink with them. He will hardly work beside them, and regards himself as a creature immeasurably superior of the newcomer."

This self-contempt — "the greatest damage done to the Negro by slavery," as Naipaul puts it—is indeed the most profound injury suffered by the oppressed. We have a parallel in Jewish self-hatred—accepting subconsciously the criteria of the anti-Semite that it is the race itself, in other words all his fellow-Jews, who are to be blamed for the misfortunes which have befallen his people; and we find it, more individually so, in prisons and concentration camps where, after a certain period of confinement, political prisoners begin to believe in their own guilt.

Writing again of Trinidad, Naipaul says: "The Negro has a deep contempt for all that is not white; his values are the values of white imperialism at its most bigoted. The Indian despises the Negro for not being Indian; he has, in addition, taken over all the white prejudices against the Negro and with the convert's zeal regards as Negro everyone who has a tincture of Negro blood."

With self-contempt at the basis of all emotions, the group is apt to disintegrate under the slightest pressure, a demonstration of which occurred during the London race riots in 1958. "White, colored, Portuguese, Indian, Chinese all thought that no rioter would attack them; there were Negroes who thought that only Jamaican Negroes would be attacked; some students and professional men thought that only lower-class Negroes would be attacked; and among respectable West Indians generally, white, brown or black, there was a feeling that the 'black fellers' had what was coming to them, and that the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

English people had been 'provoked.' " How much and how painfully this reminded me of the attitude of the German Jews at the beginning of Hitler's reign of terror, when they felt certain that only Polish Jews living in Germany would be attacked by the Storm Troops and that, moreover, they had what was coming to them! Any group, which has no binding philosophy, is apt to disintegrate under pressure into its component parts—and its component parts are hardly ever a pretty sight.

Pressure, of course, may under slightly different circumstances give rise to counter-pressure of an equally negative type, and in Jamaica, which is 80 percent black, black racialism is taking on exceedingly ugly forms. "What cannot be denied is that just as in England the fascists frenziedly proclaim the racial attitudes of the majority, who are scandalized only by the exhibitionism, so in Jamaica the Ras Tafarians express the basic racial attitude of the majority of the black population. Race—in the sense of black against brown, yellow and white, in that order—is the most important issue in Jamaica today. The hypocrisy which permitted the middle-class brown Jamaican to speak of racial harmony, while carefully maintaining the shade distinctions which preserved his privileges, is at last provoking anger and creating a thoroughly negative black racism. . . . The business enterprises of the Chinese and Syrian communities have aroused envy and hostility. And the rich white tourists, enjoying the private white sand beaches of hotels, where charges for one day exceed the average earnings of a Jamaican for a month, are a standing provocation."

And the most original thought that came to Bustamente, as Jamaica gained so-called independence last year, was to offer the U.S. a site for a naval base!

For seven months, Naipaul traveled through these desolate and derelict territories over which the memory of slavery hangs like an impenetrable cloud, and his book would have been a Job's tale had it not been for his visit to British Guiana, which has been lucky in having found leaders—"the Jagans are the most energetic campaigning politicians in the West Indies. Every weekend they, or their ministerial colleagues, go to *some part of the country*"—*who* have tried to give concrete expression to a basic philosophy. Not that all is sweetness and light in BG, for "Dr. Jagan is all things to all men. For some he is to be distrusted because he is a communist; for others he is to be distrusted because he has ceased to be a communist. . . . For some he is a racial leader, and for others he represents a radical racial change; he is not white. The colonial system, being what it is, many browns and blacks—brown and black but 'respectable'—find this hard to forgive."

Cheddi and Janet Jagan—she

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

is also Minister of Labor—know every part of British Guiana the way other couples know every corner of their front yard, and "whenever in a country area Dr. Jagan stands still, he is at once surrounded by people who have favors to ask. That the government is elected does not matter; the people require it to be as paternalistic as before, if a little more benevolently so; and a popular government must respond. 'The people' have learnt their power and the sensation is still so new that every new voter regards himself as a pressure group. In this way, the people —not the politicians' abstraction, but the people who wish to beg, bribe and bully, because this is the way things got done in the past—in this way the people are a threat to responsible government and a threat, finally, to their own leaders. It is part of the colonial legacy."

And thus the legacy remains, even where things are at their best and most promising, for slavery, like fascism, destroyed men's souls as well as men's bodies, and the memory of slavery will not soon be forgotten. "So many things in the West Indies speak of slavery. There is slavery in the vegetation. In the sugar-cane brought by Columbus on that second voyage when, to Queen Isabella's fury, he proposed the enslavement of the Amerindians. In the bread-fruit, cheap slave food, three hundred trees of which were taken to St. Vincent by Captain Bligh in 1793 and sold for a thousand pounds. . . . And just as in the barren British Guiana savannah lands a clump of cashew trees marks the site of an Amerindian village, so in Jamaica a clump of star-apple trees marks the site of a slave provision ground. There is slavery in the food, in the salt-fish still beloved by the islanders. Slavery in the absence of family life, in the laughter in the cinema at films of German concentration camps, in the fondness for terms of racial abuse, in the physical brutality of strong to weak: Nowhere in the world are children beaten as savagely as in the West Indies."

There is slavery even, as I remember, on the splendid terraces where idle tourists sip their daiquiris, served by the descendants of those who once made the Middle Passage. And it will take more than one Cheddi Jagan to eradicate the memory of stench and filth and hunger and disease which has plagued these islands for hundreds of years. It will need the integration of societies which are but the fragments of a social structure; it will need self-recognition and self-criticism, not self-contempt or self-pity; and it will need much sympathy, such as Naipaul has shown, in removing the lid from one of the world's regions which magazine readers in the United States know only as a "tourist paradise," but which has been the scene of some of man's greatest degradation.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

AMERICAN RADICALISM: FURTHER DISCUSSION

In the February issue of MR, we published an article entitled "American Radicalism: Liberal or Socialist?" by Ronald Radosh. This was answered in the March issue by Robert Forrey. This month we publish two further comments on the same subject, one by Max Gordon (who was a member of the editorial board and staff of the *Daily Worker* and *The Worker* for many years until he severed his connection in 1958) and one by Robert E. Jackson.—The Editors

BY MAX GORDON

It is regrettable, though probably inevitable, that each generation of young radicals should experience the same tactical conflicts which bedevilled earlier generations, and that some among them should fall heir to ancient sectarian attitudes. Such, I believe, is the fate of Ronald Radosh.

Radosh castigates the "Left" of the 30's and of today for forming united fronts with liberals in behalf of reform. He insists, instead, that the "Left" divorce itself from all liberal popular movements for what were once known as "immediate demands," and that it devote itself exclusively to developing socialist alternatives to capitalist society. This conflict between "immediate demands" and "ultimate aims" is, of course, an historic one in the American Left.

It is curious that a student of American history should have overlooked the existence of a political grouping which has been doing precisely what he demands for well over a half a century—the Socialist Labor Party. Does Radosh suggest that the entire Left enter the SLP, or that it set up other such organizations? What grounds are there for believing that either alternative would result in less futility than the past and present efforts of the SLP?

Further, if Radosh had dug a bit more deeply into the history of the 30's, he would have noted that one section of the recognized political Left (the SLP has been too irrelevant to American politics to be considered part of the Left) did follow his recipe for radicals, at least as regards political alliances—

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the Socialist Party. The result was a catastrophic drop in influence, in fact its virtual elimination as a significant independent factor in the nation's politics. Its presidential vote, for example, declined from 884,000 in 1932 to 187,000 in 1936, to 100,000 in 1940, and to 80,000 in 1944. Radosh may argue that election results have little significance where the only aim is education for socialism. In fact, however, the drastic drop in the SP vote registered its increasing impotence and futility as an instrument for socialist education. Surely Radosh cannot deny that the sector of the Left whose tactics he specifically condemns—the Communists (though he avoids the use of the name)—has been conspicuously more effective in the retention of what socialist consciousness exists among today's youth than the Socialists.

Those of us who lived through the great social conflicts of the 30's are, understandably, sensitive to the misconceptions held by those who have obtained their knowledge of them second hand. Thus, Radosh is critical of "leftists" for having merely acted as "advanced humanitarians, concerned with easing the suffering of the unemployed, achieving better working conditions for labor, civil rights for the Negro people, and other social gains," and for failure to fight for socialist alternatives.

No! This misses the precise point regarding the nature of "leftist" activity which is relevant to Radosh's critique. The "Left" was not simply concerned with easing the suffering of the unemployed; it *organized* a massive, historic movement of the unemployed which not only fought effectively for palliative measures but led thousands of Americans to embrace socialist ideology and many to retain it to this day, in some cases passing it on to their children. The "Left" did not "achieve better working conditions for labor." It was the advance guard, ideologically, for the industrial unionization of the workers in the mass production industries and an important factor in the actual expansion of the trade union movement from 3 million to 15 million in a few short years. Nor was the "Left" simply concerned with civil rights. It brought the question of Negro oppression dramatically to public attention through the organization of militant movements involving Negroes in the South

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

particularly, and the effects of this have been lasting. Similarly, it aided significantly in the resurgence of the National Farmers Union and initiated the political organization of intellectuals and cultural figures.

Radosh is critical because in its manifold activities the "Left" failed to demand the establishment of a socialist commonwealth. This, of course, was the constant breast-beating refrain of the Communist Party leadership at that time. As one who was then a Communist functionary intimately engaged in these activities, I can say that we were laggard in this because it would have rendered us impotent organizationally, would have isolated us from the historic movements which we had helped to set into motion, and would have made us as sterile and futile as the SLP and the SP at the time. With the development of the Cold War, the Communist Party did put its overall ideological considerations above its association with mass political movements and thereby removed itself from any relevance to American politics. *Those of us who were involved in the events of 1947-1957 know only too well from our intimate, personal experience that it was this which resulted in the Party's "decimation as a viable political force," and not, as Radosh rather absurdly suggests, the Party's failure to present a socialist alternative to the New Deal. The Socialist Party, which was decimated because it tried to present such an alternative, has recently made attempts to get back into the "mainstream" of American politics, recognizing that its isolation has been of no help to the development of socialist ideology.*

In criticizing the "Left" for having "fallaciously" stressed the fascist danger in the 30's, Radosh also indicates he has not caught the essence of that period. Aside from the fact that fascism had engulfed Germany, Italy, and parts of Eastern Europe, and was threatening to engulf all Western Europe and parts of the Americas, it was by no means confined to the Liberty League here. Coughlinism was a mass phenomenon; Bund groups were spreading terror in several major cities of the nation; Silver Shirt organization was rampant; it was public knowledge that corporate leaders were seeking a likely candidate for a fascist takeover. Sinclair Lewis's *It Can't Happen Here* was not simply a reflection of "leftist" fears. In fact

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

such was the atmosphere of reaction that, as Radosh doubtless knows, a major publication, *The Literary Digest*, confidently predicted an overwhelming defeat for Roosevelt in 1936. The actual result was partly due to the dread fear of fascism that gripped some sections of the population, and no one can estimate just how effective in achieving this result was the "Left's" alarm over fascism and its emphasis on the united front to defeat it.

Radosh suggests that our entry into World War II was dictated solely by the concern of America's corporate elite with German and Japanese threats to its penetration of Asian and Latin American markets, and he cites William A. Williams' discussion on this matter in *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy*. Williams, however, is not that crude an economic determinist. He notes that there were also moral aspects to our entry, that Americans were convinced they were defending an "anti-colonial democracy." Irrespective of what American leaders believed, most politically aware Americans did have a genuine concern with the defense of our democracy and restoring democracy in the areas conquered by the Axis. One wonders whether Radosh considers this to have been a fallacy, too. In any case, the fact that he ignores this anti-fascist aspect of the war suggests that, like the "Left" he criticises, he has failed to recognize both the great hold "bourgeois democracy" has on Americans and its intrinsic values. To explain this democracy in material terms does not explain it away.

Critical of the struggle against fascism in the 30's, Radosh is equally critical of "Left" concern with the "insignificant" ultra-Right today and the "Left's" consequent support of the "liberal administration" as a bulwark against it. As he reveals in his discussion, what is involved here is not a threat of fascism but of nuclear war. To Radosh, and he is not alone in this, there is no difference between those who want to launch a military invasion of Cuba and those who shy away from such an invasion though they would like to get rid of Castro; between those who want to wage all-out Cold War against the Soviet Union even if it means nuclear war, and those who recognize that neither side can win the Cold War or nuclear war, that negotiations and concessions are necessary to blunt the conflict.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Yet these are the real political battles going on in our nation today, and you either participate in them or you are reduced to the role of parlor politician. To conjure up ideal programs and positions, no matter how rational abstractly, may satisfy the conscience but is irrelevant to the real conflict.

This does not mean support of the Kennedy administration in all its actions. It does mean alliance with the politically-active elements in the liberal community who are pressing the administration for specific peace, social welfare, and civil rights measures today; and that you do not withdraw from the fateful battles of today to agitate for a distantly future socialism, as Radosh suggests.

In *MR's* February "Review of the Month" there is a magnificent, passionate statement of the meaning of the threat of nuclear war to human society, and a bitter castigation of our generation "so filled with complacency that we can go about our work while the plans to burn whole countries and continents go forward." Does not this complacency also apply to those "leftists" who can coolly talk about radicals removing themselves from the significant political conflicts intimately concerned with war and peace, so that they might remain undisturbed in their tight little circles discussing and dreaming of a socialism in the millennium? And does not experience reveal that this, in fact, is the most futile way to advance socialist thinking in the land?

BY ROBERT E. JACKSON

Mr. Forrey believes it is better to have a Cold War partisan than a War Now partisan directing our foreign policy. Does he imply that this country is not ruled by monopoly capitalists under a Democratic administration but is ruled by monopoly capitalists only under a Republican administration? He ought to re-read the fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism.

Does Mr. Forrey really believe Barry Goldwater could be elected President? Or that it is necessary for our ruling class to have such a person in the White House? Fascism can be established at any time, and a war against the Soviet Union

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

can be waged either under Democrats, or under Republicans, or under liberals. World War I, World War II, the invasion of Cuba, the war against South Vietnam, the Korean War—all were under Democratic administrations.

A correct theory for the Left does not concern Mr. Forrey. He already has *the* correct theory, and no soul-searching or brain-racking is necessary. He thinks a new theory will be merely militant and impractical. As a Communist, he can turn militancy on or off like a faucet. However, practical activities are needed to get followers on issues unrelated to theory. This is good Leninism: don't scare people away with theories they may not like.

Finally, Forrey does not take orders from Moscow because Marxism is scientific, and science makes for agreement among Communists. For example, the current dispute between the Soviet Union and People's China!

A Challenge to All Americans!

In this major speech, the foremost Communist spokesman answers the most crucial questions of our time: Is war inevitable? Is peaceful coexistence possible? How can disarmament and a ban on nuclear tests be achieved? Can the U.S.A. head off a new depression? What is the meaning of the ideological debate in the world Communist movement? You will find the answers in

The Only Choice—
Peaceful Coexistence
BY GUS HALL

Read, study, spread this pamphlet among your friends, neighbors, shopmates, fellow students; in your trade union, fraternal organizations, peace group; to all who want peace, democracy, equal rights and security.

25c a copy; five for $1.00
NEW CENTURY PUBLISHERS
832 Broadway New York 3, N. Y.

(Advertisement)

MR PRESS REMINDER

You have until April 22nd to order

THE MENACE OF THE MIRACLE

by Heinz Abosch

at the prepub price of only $3.25

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

For the time of your life!

ONCE AGAIN the National GUARDIAN offers a new and different kind of European Tour. Based on the lessons of three successful past tours, the 1963 GUARDIAN visit to Eastern Europe is thoughtfully-paced to provide ample opportunity for real people-to-people exchange.

The itinerary, decided by the travelers themselves, includes Denmark, the U.S.S.R., Rumania, Hungary and Czechoslovakia, plus Greece and Israel on Tour B. And in all of these places you will *meet the people*—in kindergartens and kibbutzim, in schools and factories, in briefings by government representatives and GUARDIAN correspondents and readers abroad.

- **GUARDIAN tourists spend more time on the ground, less flying from place to place.**
- **GUARDIAN tours skip the resort areas for more time in cities and environs.**
- **GUARDIAN tourists are not strangers abroad—to each other or the people they meet. They're a homogeneous group, dedicated to peace and progress, welcomed wherever they go.**

So join us for the time of your life! Depart from New York on SAS jet Sat., July 27—return Aug. 17 or 24, or when you please. Write for information or send $10 deposit to—

GUARDIAN TOURS

197 East 4th St. **New York 9, N. Y.**

(Advertisement)

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

MR PRESS BOOKS

	List Price	Price with Sub*
REPORT TO THE STOCKHOLDERS by John Beecher	$3.00	$7.50
THE UNITED STATES, CUBA, AND CASTRO by William A. Williams	3.25	8.00
THE SECOND REVOLUTION IN CUBA by J. P. Morray	3.25	8.00
CUBA—ANATOMY OF A REVOLUTION by Huberman and Sweezy	3.50	8.00
GUERRILLA WARFARE by Che Guevara	3.50	8.00
CROSSING THE LINE by Claud Cockburn	3.50	8.00
AN ESSAY ON ECONOMIC GROWTH AND PLANNING by Maurice Dobb	3.50	8.00
THE LIFE AND IDEAS OF ROBERT OWEN by A. L. Morton	3.50	8.00
WELLINGTON ROAD by Margaret Lassell	3.75	8.50
VIEW FROM THE WEST by Claud Cockburn	3.75	8.50
BURNING CONSCIENCE by Claude Eatherly and Gunther Anders	4.00	8.50
THE ALIENATION OF MODERN MAN by Fritz Pappenheim	4.00	8.50
PRIDE OF STATE by J. P. Morray	4.00	8.50
TIDE WITHOUT TURNING by John Gill	4.50	9.00
THE EMPIRE OF OIL by Harvey O'Connor	5.00	9.00
THE WALL BETWEEN by Anne Braden	5.00	9.00
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF GROWTH by Paul A. Baran	5.00	9.00
NORTH FROM MEXICO by Carey McWilliams	5.00	9.00
THE PRESENT AS HISTORY by Paul M. Sweezy	5.00	9.00

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

MR PRESS BOOKS

	List Price	Price with Sub
THE THEORY OF CAPITALIST DEVELOPMENT by Paul M. Sweezy	6.00	10.00
THE RAGGED TROUSERED PHILANTHROPISTS by Robert Tressell	6.00	10.00
THE GREAT ROAD by Agnes Smedley	6.75	10.50
EDUCATION AND THE WORKING CLASS by Jackson and Marsden	6.75	10.50
CASTE, CLASS & RACE by Oliver C. Cox	7.50	11.00
WORLD CRISIS IN OIL by Harvey O'Connor	7.50	11.00
FROM YALTA TO DISARMAMENT by J. P. Morray	8.50	12.00

(* *All foreign subs, add $1 to price quoted*)

MR PRESS PAPERBACKS

CAPITALISM YESTERDAY AND TODAY
by Maurice Dobb (flexible cloth binding) $1.00

THE ALIENATION OF MODERN MAN
by Fritz Pappenheim 1.25

AMERICAN RADICALS: SOME PROBLEMS AND PERSONALITIES
Harvey Goldberg, editor 1.25

AMERICAN LABOR IN MIDPASSAGE
Bert Cochran, editor 1.25

MAN'S WORLDLY GOODS
by Leo Huberman 1.75

CUBA: ANATOMY OF A REVOLUTION
by Leo Huberman and Paul M. Sweezy 1.75

THE PRESENT AS HISTORY
by Paul M. Sweezy (flexible cloth binding) 2.95

PAPERBACK SPECIAL All the above books 9.00

Monthly Review Press 333 Sixth Avenue New York 14, N. Y.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

CONTENTS OF VOLUME XIV

Author	Title	No.	Page
A Letter	*Murder In Los Angeles: A Protest*	5	285
An Economic Observer	*Idle Machines*	2	84
Anonymous	*Cuba's Mission: Letter From Cuba*	10	549
	Hunger And Democracy: A Letter From A Mexican	6	299
Baran, Paul A.	*A Few Thoughts On The Great Debate*	1	34
with Paul M. Sweezy	*Monopoly Capital*	¾	all
	Rejoinder To Butenko	12	669
Beecher, John	*Homage To A Subversive*	1	11
Boggs, James	*Black Political Power: A Review*	11	634
Bondy, Sebastian Salazar	*Andes and Sierra Maestra*	8	414
Buchanan, Keith M.	*The Demolition Men: The U.S. And The Crisis Of Neutrality In Southeast Asia*	10	575
Butenko, Anatoly	*The Great Debate: A Reply To Baran and Sweezy*	12	663
Crosby, Alexander L.	*There's Something In The Air*	1	19
Eden, Philip	*What Is Full Employment?*	6	309
Editors, The	*Selecciones De Monthly Review*	12	672
	Where We Stand	1	60
Emspak, Julius	*The Private Ownership Of Public Property*	2	96
Evanier, David	*The Paralysis Of Agony: A Review*	5	280
Forrey, Robert	*American Radicalism: A Reply To Mr. Radosh*	11	621
Frank, Andrew Gunder	*Mexico: The Janus Faces Of Twentieth-Century Bourgeois Revolution*	7	370
	The Varieties Of Land Reform	12	656
Fruchter, Norm	*Radical Departure: A Review*	9	521
Fuentes, Carlos	*The Argument Of Latin America: Words For The North Americans*	9	487
Gibson, Richard	*The Algerian Revolution Begins*	11	613
Glass, Ruth	*Ashes Of Discontent: The Past As Present In Jamaica*	1	23
Gordon, Max	*American Radicalism: Further Discussion*	12	693
Healey, Dorothy	*Why I Will Not Register*	7	362
Horowitz, David	*Reply To Mr. Kofsky*	8	451
Jackson, Robert E.	*American Radicalism: Further Discussion*	12	697
Johansen, Leif	*Marxism And Mathematical Economics*	9	505
Juliao, Francisco	*Brazil, A Christian Country*	5	243

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Author	*Title*	*No.*	*Page*
Kaplow, Jeffry	*A True Internationalist: A Review*	7	395
Kofsky, Frank	*The Student Movement: A Review*	6	329
	Rejoinder To Horowitz	8	455
LeRoy, Gaylord C.	*The Return To Organizing*	5	267
Lynn, Conrad J.	*Submit Or Fight? A Review*	12	685
MacDonald, Wilson	*The Questionnaire*	5	283
Miliband, Ralph	*C. Wright Mills*	5	260
Morray, J. P.	*Questions And Answers On Cuba*	5	236
Morray, Marjorie K.	*The Food Situation In Cuba*	2	81
Morrison, Philip	*The World Of Science*	6	301
Munk, Michael	*Revolution On The Farm*	10	538
Nearing, Scott	*See World Events*		
Prager, Theodore	*On The Political Economy Of Western Europe*	8	436
Radosh, Ronald	*American Radicalism: Liberal Or Socialist?*	10	564
Reade, Eugene J.	*Socialist Societies: The Seamy Side*	2	112
Review Of The Month	*A Fool's Game: China-India, The Border Dispute*	9	465
	Another Cuban Crisis	6	289
	Notes On Latin America	11	593
	Stagnation And Steel	1	1
	The Cuban Crisis In Perspective	8	401
	The Real Issue In Mississippi	7	337
	The Split In The Capitalist World	12	641
	To The Class Of 1962	2	65
	U. S. Capitalism At An Impasse	5	225
	Where The World Stands	10	529
Robinson, Joan	*Marxism: Religion And Science*	8	423
Rosenwald, Dorothy Monet	*A Passionate Dialogue: A Review*	2	125
Saxton, Alexander	*The Seed Beneath The Fallout Shelter: A Review*	8	458
Schaff, Adam	*Marxism And Existentialism, Part 1*	1	12
	Part 2	2	100
Schneider, Eugene V.	*C. Wright Mills And The American Left*	10	553
Snow, Edgar	*Facts About Food In China*	7	346
Sweezy, Paul M.	*A Great American*	2	74
	The 22nd Congress And International Socialism	1	45
with Paul A. Baran	*Monopoly Capital*	¾	all
	Rejoinder To Butenko	12	669
Tawney, R. H.	*Work And Property*	6	319
Wassermann, Ursula	*The Legacy Of Slavery: A Review*	12	688
Wilson, H. H.	*Reflections On The Spanish Civil War*	5	251
World Events by Scott Nearing		In every issue except ¾	

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

(*continued from back cover*)

We are glad to inform MR readers that the Confederation of Iranian Students in the U.S. is publishing as a 60-page pamphlet Jerrold L. Walden's essay *The International Petroleum Cartel in Iran—Private Power and the Public Interest,* which originally appeared in the *Journal of Public Law.* The price is $1 and copies may be ordered from *Pendar,* P.O. Box 252, Cambridge 38, Mass. (Please order from *Pendar,* not from us.)

It appears from a recent memorandum circulated by the Women Strike for Peace that this excellent movement still lacks contacts in the following 15 states: Alaska, Arkansas, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Maine, Minnesota, Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, and Wyoming. It has only one contact in the following 10 states: Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, and West Virginia. Any MR readers in these states who would like to help get the WSP going should get in touch with the Washington headquarters: Women Strike for Peace, 1822 Massachusetts Avenue, Washington 6, D.C.

Our hats are off to Professor and Mrs. Alan MacEwan who have brought suit to enjoin Secretary of State Dean Rush and Attorney General Robert Kennedy from interfering with their right to travel to Cuba. The Emergency Civil Liberties Committee is supporting the MacEwans in this test of the validity of the State Department's restrictions on travel through the denial of passports.

Scott Nearing's first report after getting back from his current Latin American tour will be a forum on "Revolution in Latin America," Friday, April 26th at the Militant Labor Forum, 116 University Place, New York City. Contribution $1, Students 50¢.

Monthly Review Associates is proud to announce that its usual spring meeting, somewhat delayed this year, will be held on April 24th. The speaker will be Sir Leslie Plummer, a British Labor M.P. since 1951, who has taken a special interest in foreign affairs, agriculture, and colonial affairs. For more than 30 years a newspaper manager, Sir Leslie is widely traveled and is a close friend of Harold Wilson, the new Leader of the Parliamentary Labor Party. His subject will be "The New Political Situation in Britain." For details, see the box below.

MONTHLY REVIEW ASSOCIATES

invites you to hear

SIR LESLIE PLUMMER, M.P.

on

THE NEW POLITICAL SITUATION IN BRITAIN

Date: Wednesday, April 24, at 8:30 sharp

Place: Palm Gardens, 306 West 52 St., N. Y.

Admission $1 in advance • $1.50 at the door • Associates free

Send your order for tickets, with payment enclosed, to

Monthly Review Associates, 333 Sixth Ave., New York 14, N. Y.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

(*continued from inside front cover*)
me, you'll certainly read some of the smaller-type extracts reporting talk from interviews—with working-class and middle-class parents and children (now aged something like 23 to 30)—damn nice ear for speech rhythms. Others will probably take in some of the tables, which I either glanced at or skipped. (3) Read Chapter 6, pp. 197-225, reading at least one or two of the paragraphs aloud. And read the Matthew Arnold aloud, pp. 221-222." After following this advice, you'll probably want to read the whole book, and you'll be glad you did.

Reviews of MR Press books are so scarce we like to call attention to them when they occur. Thus the *St. Louis Post-Dispatch* of March 2nd carries a favorable review of Harvey O'Connor's *World Crisis in Oil* which concludes: "Mr. O'Connor's book is extremely informative. He writes with a small bias against the cartels and presumably for the common man. But his evidence is all proper nouns and dates and hard figures. He has done a very good work in synthesizing his viewpoint." And a very fair review of J. P. Morray's *From Yalta to Disarmament* in the London *Times Literary Supplement* of January 4th contains the following overall evaluation: "Mr. Morray has made an excellent job of sorting out the real issues between the western and Soviet alliances in the fifteen years after the war. In particular, he has brought out clearly the essential difference of approach which underlay all the frustrations and misunderstandings."

Here are passages from two other recent reviews. Saul Landau writes in the Hispanic American Report (February) of William A. Williams' *The United States, Cuba, and Castro*. "Professor Williams, a history professor at the University of Wisconsin, has produced a book of great insight and value, which cuts through the mountain of trash that has passed for truth on the Cuban Revolution. In addition, he has effectively demolished the main thesis of Theodore Draper (and the State Department)." And Nancy Scott writes in the *People's World* (March 16) of John Beecher's *Report to the Stockholders*: "Beecher's style, as his politics, is unfashionable and some readers may decide he is writing polemics, not poetry. Look again—the language is clean, the words well chosen, the emotions communicate and if you bother to read it aloud, it reads like poetry, not pamphleteering."

While we're on the subject of John Beecher's book, readers will be interested to know that the author has been named to the post of Poet in Residence at the University of Santa Clara, California. And the book itself in its original edition (of which the MR Press edition is a photo offset copy) was one of 27 books selected for the 1963 Western Books Exhibition, a juried show which goes to university and public libraries all over the U.S. and Canada (in New York it is shown at the American Institute of Graphic Arts).

William Blake, whose book *An American Looks at Karl Marx* will be remembered by many MR Readers, writes of J. P. Morray's *The Second Revolution in Cuba*: "Morray's book is masterly. Conceived in the spirit, and with the technique, of Marx's *Class Struggles in France* and *The Eighteenth Brumaire*, it is the best exposition since that time that I have seen, of the va-et-vient of class motion, dynamics, and the play of personalities in a revolution." Higher praise hath no man.

LICENSED TO MR.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Coming in May . . .

THREE TACTICS

The Background in Marx

by Stanley Moore

An analysis of tensions and conflicts in Marx's theories connected with the quarrels over tactics that have split each generation of Marxists since the death of Engels. In three extended essays — "Marx and Minority Revolution," "Marx and Majority Revolution," and "Marx and Reformism" — opposing tactical doctrines are related to contrasting theoretical models of the transition from capitalism to socialism. The aim of the work is to trace back to Marx some of the issues currently dividing Khrushchev, Mao, and Tito.

List Price—$2.25 **Prepub price—$1.50**

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED